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Abstract: This thesis evaluates the Obama administration’s use of drone strikes in the ‘war 
on terror’ in relation to what Carl Schmitt called the ‘concept of the political’. After arguing 
that the Schmittian distinction between friend and enemy underlined Bush’s war on terror, 
as did many scholars, I interrogate whether this is still true for Obama’s war on terror. 
Obama’s rhetorical legitimising strategy creates the appearance of difference to Bush, and 
is also far less overtly Schmittian; focusing instead on the legality and operational qualities 
of drone strikes. However, my analysis of the material and technological conditions of 
drone strikes shows that Obama misrepresents the nature of political relations in his war 
on terror. I uncover an alternative picture that highlights key paradoxes of the relation 
between user and receiver of force, the US military’s treatment of civilian casualties, and 
the participation of technology and technological thought in producing these relations. I 
then map these analyses onto Schmitt’s theory of the political division between friend and 
enemy in this ‘age of technology’. Obama’s ‘enemy’ is different to Schmitt’s understanding 
and has also evolved in comparison with Bush’s due to the approach taken to select the 
enemy in so-called ‘signature strikes’, and the role of technology in this process. The drive 
to annihilate the abstract enemy also extends well beyond Schmitt’s understanding of 
defeat in war, and demonstrates the fine balance between hyperpoliticisation and 
transformed political relations. Based on the interpretation that the friend is formed in 
relation to political rhetoric, Obama’s ‘friend’ grouping also evolves in comparison with 
Bush’s. Thus, despite Obama’s rhetoric making his war appear less Schmittian than did 
Bush, and the utilisation of the drone engendering some material and technological 
evolutions, Obama’s war on terror is still tied to a Schmittian concept of the political. 
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Introduction 
 
 
This thesis analyses contemporary uses of force by the US government, and in particular 
the recent use of drone strikes to target ‘suspected terrorists’1, in relation to what Carl 
Schmitt called the ‘concept of the political’.2 This thesis argues that the underlying concept 
of the political has transformed since the Bush administration’s ‘war on terror’. Critical 
scholarship largely approached this war through the frame of Schmittian politics, and 
indeed the ‘concept of the political’ in Obama’s continuation of that war, this thesis 
suggests, remains essentially Schmittian—despite Obama’s very different political rhetoric, 
and important material evolutions in the technology used to exercise violent force. Yet 
these elements, and in particular the central participation of technology in the production of 
political relations, has transformed the nature of those political relations in Obama’s war, 
when compared with both Bush’s war and Schmitt’s historically situated understanding of 
politics. 
 
This introduction first presents the factual background and existing scholarship that has 
given rise to this research. I examine how scholars approached Bush’s war on terror 
through a Schmittian lens, and some important differences between Schmitt’s and Bush’s 
contexts. Secondly, I introduce the central issues confronted by this thesis, with this 
historical and scholarly backdrop in mind: whether Obama’s change in rhetoric after the 
Bush administration, and increased use of the ‘drone’ to execute strikes,3 signals a 
                                                 
1 Jack Serle, ‘Almost 2,500 Now Killed by Covert US Drone Strikes Since Obama Inauguration Six Years 
Ago’ The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (February 2 2015) < 
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2015/02/02/almost-2500-killed-covert-us-drone-strikes-obama-
inauguration/> accessed September 1 2015. 
2 Carl Schmitt, George Schwab (trans), The Concept of the Political (University of Chicago Press 1996) 
3 Also known as an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). ‘Drone’ or ‘UAV’ is used henceforth in this thesis. 
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departure from Schmitt’s concept of the political. This also raises a key question regarding 
the participation of technology in the production of political relations given Schmitt’s belief 
that ‘technology’ and the ‘political’ are antithetical domains.4 The third section identifies the 
literatures and debates to which this thesis contributes. This includes: scholarship on the 
legality of the pre-emptive use of force, debates on state rhetoric, critical engagements 
with state uses of drone strikes that address the relation between materiality and political 
power, and scholarship engaged with Schmitt’s understanding of legitimacy, politics, and 
technology. In the final part of this introduction, I set out the narrative structure of this 
thesis, which unfolds over three chapters. The first chapter addresses Obama’s legality-
centric legitimising strategy in comparison with Bush’s divisive rhetoric. The second 
chapter then evaluates the material and technological conditions of drone strikes ‘behind’ 
Obama’s rhetoric, which reveals an alternative picture that highlights key paradoxes of the 
relation between user and receiver of force. The third chapter then considers these 
analyses in relation Schmitt’s understanding of politics and technology; drawing the 
conclusion that there has been a transformation of the Schmittian political in Obama’s war 
on terror. 
 
 The Schmittian Perspective on Bush’s War on Terror 
 
Schmitt believed that the ‘political’ can be reduced to the ‘concrete and existential’ 
distinction ‘between friend and enemy’.5 The ‘political’ is therefore not present everywhere 
since it emerges only when a collective grouping identifies another grouping as an 
‘enemy’; making politics a fundamentally conflictual domain for Schmitt.6 Although the 
                                                 
4 Carl Schmitt, Matthias Konzett & John McCormick (trans) ‘The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations’ 
(Dunker & Humblot 1963). 
5 Schmitt, (n 2) 27. 
6 ibid 
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Concept of the Political was originally published in 1932, ‘Schmitt’s critique is more 
relevant now than ever’.7 As we see below, this is true even when scholars assert that 
Schmitt would have disagreed with Bush’s politics in the war on terror, or that the form of 
‘enemy’ has changed. This resurgence of Schmittian scholarly approaches has occurred in 
spite of Schmitt’s position within academia as a highly polarising figure, with some 
believing that the spectre of Nazism and the Holocaust ‘should always haunt any invoking 
of Schmitt or Schmittian understandings of the political’.8 Such beliefs now appear to be 
located in the shadow of the broader recognition that Schmitt’s work can help better 
understand contemporary state practices, and offers a tool for critiquing state exercises of 
power, particularly the US government’s war on terror. 
 
Schmitt’s concept of the political has indeed been one of the dominant theoretical frames 
for understanding Bush’s war on terror. According to Chantal Mouffe, Carl Schmitt’s 
‘emphasis on the ever present possibility of the friend/enemy distinction and the conflictual 
nature of politics constitutes the necessary starting point’ when analysing political action.9 
Many scholars have since found Schmitt’s notion of politics irresistible as the ‘essential 
prerequisite of the existence of a people as a political community’.10 This has become 
increasingly so ‘after 9/11’ when ‘interest in [Schmitt] ratcheted up again’.11 The Bush 
administration’s response to 9/11 reignited academic engagement with Schmitt’s work 
generally12, and specifically for his concept of the political.13 This relation between worldly 
                                                 
7 Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (Routledge New Ed 2005) 12. 
8 Jef Huysmans, ‘Know your Schmitt: a godfather of truth and the spectre of Nazism’, (1997) vol 25 Review 
of International Studies, 323. 
9 Mouffe, Political (n 7) 13-14. 
10 Juha-Pekka Rentto, ‘Carl Schmitt and the Tyranny of Values’, in, Matilda Arvidsson, Leila Brannstrom, 
Panu Minkkinen (eds), The Contemporary Relevance of Carl Schmitt (New York Routledge 2016) 74. 
11 David Luban, ’Carl Schmitt and the Critique of Lawfare’ (2010) vol 43 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L, 6. 
12 Schmitt’s Political Theology (University of Chicago Press 2006), alongside Giorgio Agamben’s Homo 
Sacer (Stanford University Press 1998) and State of the Exception (University of Chicago Press 2005), that 
build upon Schmitt’s work, were central to the emergence of a post-9/11 body of literature on the use of 
emergency powers, and the ‘exception’. See, for Instance: Alain de Benoist, Carl Schmitt Today: Terrorism, 
'Just' War, and the State of Emergency (Arktos Media 2013). 
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events and the relevance of Schmitt is echoed in Žižek’s remarks that, following the Cold 
War, ‘Western imagination entered a decade of confusion and inefficiency, looking for 
suitable schematisations of the Enemy’, and only after 9/11 ‘did this imagination regain its 
power by constructing the image of bin Laden, the Islamic fundamentalist, and al-Qaida, 
his ‘invisible’ network’, meaning that today, ‘tolerant liberal democracies remain deeply 
Schmittian’.14 Thus, Schmitt’s concept of ‘the political’ is not only recognised for critiquing 
totalitarian states or wars of the 20th Century, but is equally useful when analysing 
contemporary state practices. 
 
The focal point for analyses of the Schmittian nature of Bush’s war on terror has primarily 
been the rhetorical representation of the ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’ groupings by the executive 
branch. Although scholars have also recognised that particular military strategies 
employed in Bush’s war on terror are ‘deeply embedded in the Schmittian concept of 
politics and the irreducibility of the friend-enemy distinction’, this has been less a subject of 
analysis than the Bush administration’s rhetorical construction of the political.15 For 
scholars like Žižek, Bush’s representation of the war on terror offers an already visible 
form of what Schmitt calls the ‘high points of politics’, which are ‘moments in which the 
enemy is, in concrete clarity, recognised as the enemy’.16 Mouffe recognises that Bush’s 
rhetorical division sets the ‘civilised world’ against ‘enemies of freedom’, the latter of which 
                                                                                                                                                                  
13 See, the essay collection based on a Schmittian perspective: Louiza Odysseos, Fabio Petito, The 
International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Terror, Liberal War (Routledge 2007). 
14 Slavoj Žižek, ’Are we in a war? Do we have an enemy?’ (2002) vol 24:10, London Review of Books. My 
emphasis. 
15 Jason Ralph, America’s War on Terror (OUP Oxford 2013) 11. 
16 Schmitt, Political (n 2) 67. 
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was frequently identified as ‘evil’ by Bush.17 When he divides the world into these two 
camps of ‘good’ and ‘evil’, the frequent use of ‘evil’ can be said to devalue the enemy.18 
 
Whilst this thesis agrees that Bush’s war on terror is fundamentally Schmittian, Bush’s 
friend-enemy distinction offers important differences from Schmitt’s at the level of political 
relations. The dehumanising effect of Bush’s war on terror is one such point of difference 
that is central to discussions regarding the political relations formed in and by the war on 
terror.19 Judith Butler’s Precarious Life – a cornerstone of the critical debates surrounding 
the political relations formed in Bush's war on terror – recognises that the for Bush’s 
‘enemy’, ‘dehumanisation occurs first’, at the level of representation, ‘and that this level 
then gives rise to a physical violence’.20 Here, Butler shows how rhetoric can participate in 
the construction of the legitimacy of state force, an argument that I will follow in the first 
chapter of this thesis in a consideration of Obama’s rhetorical strategy. But the specific 
dehumanising effect of Bush’s rhetoric has also been a central source of objections to his 
mode of political thinking, which has been charged with attempting to render ‘the requisite 
horrors of war tolerable’.21 Schmitt himself criticised the dehumanising potential of this type 
of political division; alluding to such a position in Nomos of the Earth in which he opposes 
wars fought for ‘humanity’ because they render the enemy the opposite of this universal 
category as the inhuman or ‘unperson’.22 Consequently, Mouffe asserts that there is a 
‘profound misunderstanding’ when conflating ‘Schmitt’s approach and the one promoted 
                                                 
17 Chantal Mouffe, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Warning on the Dangers of a Unipolar World’, in Louiza Odysseos, Fabio 
Petito, The International Political Thought of Cark Schmitt: Terror, Liberal War (Routledge 2007) 147. 
18 Whilst such literature does not necessarily directly engage with Schmitt’s work, it does show the appeal of 
dividing the war on terror into the Schmittian camps of ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’. 
19 Jayne Mooney, Jock Young, ‘Imagining Terrorism: Terrorism and Anti-Terrorism Terrorism, Two Ways of 
Doing Evil’ (2005) vol 32:1 Social Justice. 
20 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Power of Mourning and Violence (Verso 2006) 34. 
21 Kimberly Elliott, ‘Subverting the Rhetorical Construction of Enemies through Worldwide Enfoldment’ (2004) 
vol 27:2 Women and Language, 99. 
22 Carl Schmitt, Nomos of the Earth (Telos Press Publishing 2003) 103. See also: Carl Schmitt, ‘The Legal 
World Revolution’ (Summer 1987) vol 72 Telos, 88. 
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by Bush’s government’, because Schmitt’s division between friend and enemy was not 
drawn on the basis of ethics, so he would not have condoned ‘Bush’s use of moral 
categories’ to form the friend-enemy division.23 This stance reveals how Schmitt’s theory 
might now be used to critique ‘US imperialism and humanitarian war’,24 but importantly, it 
does not contradict the body of post 9/11 literature that locates Bush’s war on terror as 
deeply Schmittian. Despite the recognition of a point of friction between Schmitt’s beliefs 
and Bush’s approach, scholarship evidently still locates the war on terror within a 
Schmittian political paradigm, albeit one characterised by a new moral form of division 
between friend and enemy. 
 
In addition to the above juridico-conceptual point of distinction, scholars have equally 
tended to agree that the war on terror has presented key contextual differences from 
Schmitt’s 20th century context, regarding the ‘non-specific’ form of the enemy.25 Such 
differences are also important to this thesis. At odds with Schmitt’s understanding of the 
enemy, which presumed identifiable collective groupings, debates on the war on terror 
centred on the non-specific ‘figure’ of ‘terrorism’ against which the US has directed its 
efforts.26 James Maggio has asserted that under Bush ‘terrorism’ is ‘a symbol that can be 
used and employed as a placeholder for ‘evil’ or ‘enemy’’.27 Thus, scholarship broadly 
recognises that the war on terror no longer presumes that ‘one fighting collective of people 
confronts a similar collective’ as Schmitt’s context led him to believe.28 This 
characterisation remains a plausible challenge to the Obama administration’s own ‘war on 
                                                 
23 Mouffe, Unipolar World (n 17), 147-148. 
24 Claudio Minca, Rory Rowan, On Schmitt and Space (Routledge 2015) 58. 
25 Athina Karatzogianni, Andrew Robinson, Power, Resistance and Conflict in the Contemporary World, 
(Routledge 2009) 104. 
26 The enemy becomes a less identifiable ‘figure’, see: Sara Brady, Performance, Politics, and the War on 
Terror (Palgrave Macmillan 2012) 89. Further, as Mouffe asserts, as the enemy becomes ‘private’. (n 2), 
148. 
27 James Maggio, (2007). The Presidential Rhetoric of Terror: The (Re)creation of Reality Immediately after 
9/11. Politics & Policy, 822. 
28 Schmitt, Political (n 2) 28. 
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terror’, which this thesis sets out to investigate. Such an engagement, again, does not 
confute the belief that Schmitt is key to understanding such political action, nor does it 
show Bush’s, nor Obama’s war on terror to be ‘non-Schmittian’. On the contrary, this 
seems to show the irresistible relevance of Schmitt’s work to contemporary state force, 
and it’s evident appeal when seeking to better understand the war on terror and political 
relations therein; which in Schmitt’s terms perhaps shows that we still ‘cannot escape the 
logic of the political’.29 Indeed, in this thesis, the changing and technologically-mediated 
nature of the ‘enemy’ in Obama’s war on terror—as compared to both Schmitt’s 
historically-specific understanding and Bush’s rhetorical figure of ‘terrorism’—is specifically 
analysed in relation to Schmitt’s concept of the political. 
 
 Obama’s ‘Concept of the Political’ 
 
Against the historical backdrop of Bush’s war on terror, and the scholarly attention this 
subject received in relation to Schmitt’s concept of ‘the political’, this thesis seeks to 
confront whether the Obama administration’s use of drone strikes signals a departure from 
a political paradigm defined by the friend-enemy distinction. I therefore turn my attention 
onto the concept of the political that grounds Obama ‘war on terror’, a war fought 
principally through medium of the drone. 
 
In drawing attention to the legality, protective rationale, and technical proficiency of his 
drone strike program, Obama’s rhetorical presentation of the use of force resonates much 
less overtly with the Schmittian division between ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’ than did Bush’s war 
on terror. Further, the strong ‘technological’ character of Obama’s ‘war on terror’ potentially 
signals a shift away from a Schmittian concept of the political, given the antithetical nature 
                                                 
29 ibid, 79. 
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of political and technology identified in his work.30 My thesis shows that Obama’s use of 
drone strikes is not merely an example of a state using ‘neutral’ technology to facilitate 
political goals, because technology and technological thinking participate in the production 
of the political in Obama’s war on terror. Specifically, the technological materiality of the 
Obama administration’s use of force is relevant to both his state rhetoric, which is a non-
trivial component of the political question of legitimacy, and the relations that force 
constructs between those who exercise that force and those who receive it.  
 
A closer inspection of Obama’s use of force allows us to contest the impression presented 
by his administration and will also show that the Schmittian political has not in fact been 
completely eschewed. Unlike in the Bush administration’s war on terror, where the 
Schmittian form of political relations was largely identifiable through the rhetorical 
construction of the executive’s communications dividing the world into those ‘with us’ or 
‘against us’, this thesis suggests that Obama’s rhetoric conceals far more than it 
exposes.31 To expose what is concealed, we ‘read’ the political relations that are 
constructed by the drone strike program itself, through an analysis of the material and 
technological conditions of the use of force. Doing so supports the view that Obama’s use 
of force in practice is at odds with his administration’s rhetoric and constructed narrative. 
The question that remains, then, is the precise relation of this new technology and 
corresponding form of technological thinking to the Schmittian concept of the political. 
Whilst at first glance Obama’s use of force might be thought to depart from Schmitt’s 
division between friend and enemy, it is argued that the use of drone strikes preserves yet 
transfigures this division despite key factual differences from Schmitt’s conceptualisation. 
 
                                                 
30 Schmitt, Neutralisations (n 4). 
31 George Bush, ‘Speech at Fort Hood, Killeen Texas’ (January 3 2003). 
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 The Scholarly Relevance of Obama’s ‘Schmittian’ War on Terror 
 
This thesis shares its theoretical positioning with that of scholars who aim to understand 
and evaluate contemporary events at the intersection between law, politics, and 
technology.32 Due to the interdisciplinary nature of this research, there are four bodies of 
literature from which this thesis draws, and to which it hopes to contribute in pursing the 
above argument. 
 
The first is scholarship on legal doctrine, specifically the legality of pre-emptive strikes and 
new counterterrorism techniques under international law.33 In chapter one my thesis draws 
from and builds upon doctrinal approaches to law, in order to attain a deeper 
understanding of state practices. However, the ‘legality’ of such state action is not the most 
important question. The aim of the thesis is to better understand the political relations that 
are constructed through a multiplicity of elements, which include law, state rhetoric and 
technology. As such, the legal doctrinal component of this research is considered 
alongside other elements in order to attain a bigger picture of legitimacy, wherein ‘law’ and 
‘legality’ are but constitutive components – albeit important ones. 
 
The second body of literature with which this thesis engages is Schmitt’s own writing, and 
secondary Schmittian analyses of the ‘political’ in a contemporary context. This includes 
literature that analyses contemporary state action through a Schmittian lens34 whilst also 
engaging with two main ideas from within the Schmittian paradigm; legitimacy, and the 
relation between technology and the political. This thesis offers a contemporary application 
                                                 
32 For a recent collection, see: Jan Backmann, Colleen Bell, Caroline Holmqvist (eds), War, Police and 
Assemblages of Intervention (Routledge 2015). 
33 See, for example: Anders Henriksen, ‘Jus ad bellum and American Targeted Use of Force to Fight 
Terrorism Around the World’, (2014) vol 19:2 Journal of Conflict & Security Law. 
34 See, for example: David Pan, ‘Carl Schmitt and Barack Obama on Political Identity in a Multi-polar World’ 
Telos (August 10 2010). 
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of Schmitt’s approach to legitimacy, whilst recognising the historically-specific nature of 
Schmitt’s understanding.35 The other strand of engagement is in relation to Schmitt’s 
perspective on technology and technological thinking. This thesis takes a similar approach 
to contemporary scholars such as Jacques de Ville in ‘Rethinking the Concept of the 
Political’ (who uses Schmitt’s work to examine the effect of technology on the modern 
partisan),36 and Roberto Esposito in Categories of the Impolitical, where he draws from 
Schmitt’s approach when recognising the possible effects of technological ‘neutrality’ on 
the political.37 This thesis hopes to add to such scholarship in exploring the relation 
between technology and the political, and the participation of technology in the production 
of political relations, within Obama’s war on terror. 
 
The third body of literature with which this thesis engages is on rhetoric in relation to state 
power and legitimacy. A significant body of contemporary scholarship regards rhetoric as 
being important to the formation of the legitimacy of state uses of force, maintenance of 
state power, and diagnostic of its underlying conception of the political.38 This body of 
literature on rhetoric also allows us to appreciate the tensive relation between what is said 
and what is done regarding state force. This thesis does not give either approach ‘priority’, 
but utilises both lines of enquiry to evaluate the US government’s representations of the 
new ‘war on terror’ under Obama, and the underlying use of force in practice. 
 
                                                 
35 Carl Schmitt, John McCormick, Jeffrey Seitzer (eds), Legality and Legitimacy (Duke University Press 
2004). 
36 Jacques de Ville, ‘Rethinking the Concept of the Political: Derrida’s reading of Schmitt’s ‘The Theory of the 
Partisan’, in Matilda Arvidsson, Leila Brannstrom, Panu Minkkinen (eds), The Contemporary Relevance of 
Carl Schmitt (New York Routledge 2016) 136-137. 
37 Roberto Esposito, Connal Parsley (trans), Categories of the Impolitical (Fordham University Press 2015). 
38 See, for example: Dwight Anderson, ‘Power, Rhetoric, and the State: A Theory of Presidential Legitimacy’ 
(1988) vol 50:2 The Review of Politics. 
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The fourth set of literatures is a developing body of critical engagements with state uses of 
drone strikes.39 This includes theorists such as Derek Gregory, Markus Gunneflo, and 
Joseph Pugliese, each of whom seeks to confront the effects of the medium through which 
the use of force is executed, thus revealing and critiquing the paradigm shifts created by 
extensive use of the drone.40 To the extent that these authors emphasise the importance 
of reading the material practices and conditions of the use of force, my work draws on and 
takes inspiration from the impulse to pay close attention to how materiality affects political 
relations. Although the remit of this thesis does not permit a direct engagement with them, 
this research resonates with a broader set of recent methodological approaches including 
Actor Network Theory (ANT) literatures and ‘jurisdictional thinking’.41 Together, these 
methodologies have broadly motivated the approach taken in this thesis: to address the 
connection between materiality, practice and political power in analysing the conditions of 
the drone strike, and thus to better understand the political relations drone strikes 
engender. 
 
 Thesis Outline 
 
The first chapter uses the Obama administration’s rhetorical focus on ‘legality’ in its 
strategy for legitimising drone strikes, in order to present the point of maximal difference 
from Bush’s war on terror. This is set out through an analysis of three conditions for legal 
and legitimate state uses of force in relation to Obama’s rhetorical representation of drone 
strikes, which are: the requirements for an armed conflict in international law, the 
                                                 
39 A recent exploration of the drone and drone strikes taking such an approach is Grégoire Chamayou, 
Drone Theory (Penguin 2015). 
40 See, for example: Derek Gregory, ‘Drone geographies’ (2014) vol 183 Radical Philosophy; upcoming book 
by Markus Gunneflo, Targeted Killing: A Legal and Political History (Cambridge University Press 2016); 
Joseph Pugliese, ‘Prosthetics of Law and the Anomic Violence of Drones’ (2011) vol 20:4 Griffith Law 
Review. 
41 Shaunnagh Dorsett, Shaun McVeigh, Jurisdiction (Routledge-Cavendish 2012). 
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requirements for self-defence, and finally the belief that using force should result in 
minimal civilian casualties corresponding to legal requirements for the conduct of war. 
Each of these sections also examines Bush’s rhetoric, with the aim of showing the contrast 
in the approach of each president. Accordingly, this chapter shows that Obama’s rhetoric 
constructs an impression of legality by consistently asserting that the US government 
adheres to any relevant legal requirements; whilst maintaining that drone strikes are 
necessary by virtue of the need to protect civilians from terrorist attacks. This stands in 
contrast to Bush’s rhetoric framing the war as one fought between good and evil, and his 
call that the law should not apply also to this exceptional scenario. However, although 
Obama’s rhetorical approach seems a long way from the foundation of Bush’s war on 
terror in a Schmittian political paradigm, I will later go on to show that the use of force 
presented through Obama’s legitimising strategy is at odds with its underlying practice. 
 
This ‘underside’ to drone strikes is the focus of the second chapter, which examines the 
material and technological conditions of the drone strike in order to reveal them as 
unsupportive of, or sometimes directly contradictory to, Obama’s representations. It is 
through a supplementary analysis of these conditions, I suggest, and not only state 
rhetoric, that we must analyse the political relations in Obama’s war on terror. Whilst the 
use of force is presented as legal and the drone is revered for its ability to strike with 
precision, these attributes in fact insulate the user of force and make killing easier; a fact 
that is implicated in the re-configuration of political and technological thought occasioned 
by the extensive use of drone technology in the use of lethal force. My analysis of the 
process of a drone strike and the turn toward ‘efficiency’ as a value indicate a heavily 
technological form of war. This analysis also reveals key paradoxes regarding the use of 
drone technology in state force. Despite a visual ‘intimacy’ with the target granted to the 
user of force, this arises within a highly ‘detached’ relation to that ‘target’, and merely 
13 
 
enhances the US military’s ability to kill a suspect. There is also a second form of paradox 
that emerges from this investigation. Despite the rhetorical shift identified in the first 
chapter, this ‘new’ use of force is shown to offer a continuation and intensification of 
conditions found in ‘old’ US military practices. Consider the twin conditions of safety to the 
user of force and capacity to kill from afar, which have simply afforded the drone operator 
with a position of ‘dominance’ over the target. Together, these conditions result in the 
dehumanisation of the target. Thus, the second chapter concludes having challenged the 
veracity of Obama’s account of drone strikes and uncovered in a preliminary way the 
nature of political relations in his war on terror. 
 
The third chapter directly examines the transformation of the concept of the political 
underpinning Obama’s ‘war on terror’ by examining the relation between the domains of 
politics and technology, and the friend-enemy grouping reconstructed from the reading of 
Obama’s war on terror undertaken in the previous two chapters. The relation between the 
domains of politics and technology in Obama’s war on terror is shown to engender a new 
form of the Schmittian political. Chief amongst the changes is the nature of the enemy. 
Although both Bush and Obama’s enemy is within the paradigm of indefinite war, this 
attribute of Obama’s enemy is a product of the technological form of war via the drone 
strike. This means that the condition of dehumanisation that is evident in both Obama’s 
and Bush’s war on terror is differently formed. I then turn to the ‘friend’ as the opposing 
side in the Schmitt’s political duality, arguing that the friend is constructed in relation to 
David Pan’s concept of a state’s ‘representational dynamic’. We look at the 
representational dynamic of Obama’s war on terror in comparison with Bush’s. Bush’s 
moralistic framing of the choice between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is set against Obama’s framing of 
the qualities of the medium being the only important question, as the drone is used to 
invoke the phenomenon of humane wars. Then, in line with the ‘humane’ underpinnings to 
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the use of force, it is argued that Obama cultivates a global political identity for his political 
‘friend’ grouping more effectively than did Bush. Setting this humane frame of the ‘friend’ 
against the dehumanised enemy demonstrates what Schmitt presaged when humanity 
and other ‘universal’ ideals are evoked by one side in war. 
 
Taking the arguments of these three chapters together, this thesis shows the survival and 
transformation of the Schmittian political in Obama’s war on terror. The Obama 
administration’s rhetoric provides an impression of difference to Bush’s war on terror and 
seems to indicate a shift away from Schmittian politics. My analysis of the material 
conditions of drone strikes, however, questions this difference by accounting for the 
centrality of technological thought and key paradoxes inherent to drone strikes that shape 
the political relations in Obama’s war on terror. When mapped directly onto Schmittian 
theory, we are able to see that the new form of ‘war on terror’ conducted via the drone 
strike remains tied to a Schmittian political paradigm, albeit in a way shaped by 
technology, technological thinking and the rhetoric that accompanies it. 
  15 
- 1 - 
Obama’s ‘Legal’ War on Terror 
 
 
In this chapter I argue that the Obama administration is focused on constructing an 
impression that the extensive use of drone strikes in the war on terror is legal. To secure 
an impression of ‘legality’, besides making this claim explicitly, the Obama administration 
rhetorically enhances the virtues of the drone and presents the use of force as ‘necessary’ 
in order to protect civilians. This signals a departure from Bush’s divisive rhetorical 
representation of the war on terror, the exceptionalism arguably characteristic of Bush era 
politics, and resonates much less overtly with Schmitt’s political division between ‘friend’ 
and ‘enemy’. 
 
First, I address the key role rhetoric plays in legitimising state practices, and in particular, 
its role in Bush’s war on terror. This will enable an examination of the decisive differences 
of the Obama administration’s rhetoric, which centres on legality as its legitimising 
strategy. This chapter therefore takes Obama’s framing of the war on terror as its primary 
focus, and poses legality as central to Obama’s non-Schmittian representation, thus 
signalling its clearest apparent difference from Bush’s war on terror. This is set out over 
three sections, each of which addresses a condition for the legal state use of force outside 
its territorial jurisdiction. The first argues that the US government presents drone strikes as 
being part of an armed conflict rather than a series of law enforcement operations, since 
the latter would pose far greater restrictions on the attacking party, and would bring the 
legality of the US government’s practices into contention. This strategy is set against the 
Bush administration’s rhetoric that emphasised the exceptional circumstances faced by the 
US and the need to respond with force. The second section considers the legal 
requirements for the use of force in self-defence, arguing that the transition to a new form 
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of pre-emptive self-defence was cultivated by Bush and seemingly accepted into 
international law. The Obama administration accordingly draws attention to the legality of 
its pre-emptive actions and reinforces the necessity of protecting civilians against future 
attacks. Finally, I argue that the representation of the technological conditions of drone 
strikes introduces a discourse of the ‘humane’ into Obama’s legitimising strategy because 
of its role in reducing civilian casualties, which is central to his presentation of that 
medium’s positive relationship with the legal requirements of distinction and 
proportionality. Taken together, these three parallel conditions provide a clear picture of 
the Obama administration’s rhetoric and its difference from Bush’s representation of the 
war on terror. 
 
i. Rhetoric in Bush’s and Obama’s War on Terror 
 
Rhetoric is central to shaping the represented form of political life, acting also towards the 
legitimisation of state practices including uses of force. As Morris Zelditch and Henry 
Walker assert, ‘every authority system tries to cultivate a belief in its legitimacy’.1 Indeed, 
Bush and Obama’s rhetoric shaped their respective legitimising strategies, which, when 
set against each other, reveal the point of maximal difference between their wars on terror. 
Whereas Bush’s rhetorical framing of the war on terror indicates a Schmittian form of 
politics based on the division ‘between friend and enemy’,2 for Obama legality is the most 
important attribute in his legitimising strategy. This chapter first identifies this sentiment of 
Bush’s rhetoric before examining the contrasting strategy of Obama’s ‘legality’-centric 
rhetoric in greater detail. 
 
                                                 
1 Morris Zelditch, Henry Walker, ‘The Legitimacy of Regimes’, in Shane Thye, John Skvoretz (eds) Power 
and Status (Advances in Group Processes, Volume 20), 217; Max Weber, Economy and Society (1968 
California University Press) 213. 
2 Carl Schmitt, George Schwab (trans), The Concept of the Political (University of Chicago Press 1996) 26. 
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What is rhetoric? Aristotle defined rhetoric as ‘the faculty of observing in any given case 
the available means of persuasion’.3 Indeed, Peter Goodrich suggests that a ‘major 
portion’ of classical rhetoric ‘was concerned with persuasion as the primary function of 
language use or public speech understood in terms of its social, and hence also political, 
orientation’.4 This orientation has, at times, been acknowledged as dangerous or 
duplicitous: Quintilian suggests that a particular ‘vicious’ style of embellishment’ can 
disguise ‘vice in the name of virtue’5; perhaps indicating the transition of rhetoric ‘from the 
study of argument to the appreciation of ornament, from dialectics to aesthetics’.6 
Precisely this embellishment is evident in the rhetorical construction of the ‘legality’ and 
general virtues of drone strikes seen throughout this chapter. Rhetoric ‘becomes a 
technique’ that can ‘seduce the subject and manipulate his emotions’ in various ways.7 
Utilising this technique of ‘rhetoric’ to legitimise state practices is clearly not a new 
phenomenon, but rather follows a history of US government rhetoric in relation to its 
foreign policy that has ‘set aside whole worlds of fact and contained, when it did not 
encourage, some of the most disturbing events in American history’.8 
 
 Bush’s Schmittian Rhetoric 
 
Bush’s rhetoric squarely positioned the war on terror within a Schmittian domain in which 
politics can be reduced to the distinction ‘between friend and enemy’.9 The Bush 
administration underlined this distinction consistently in its communications regarding the 
war on terror. On the one hand, the enemy – initially those responsible for 9/11 – became 
                                                 
3 Aristotle, Rhys Roberts (trans), The Rhetoric, (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1984) 24. 
4 Peter Goodrich, ‘Rhetoric As Jurisprudence: An Introduction to the Politics of Legal Language’ (1984) vol 
4:1 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 93. 
5 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, 3.8.10-11. 
6 Goodrich, (n 4) 105. 
7 Piyel Haldar, ‘The function of the Ornament in Quintilian, Alberti, and Court Architecture’, in Costas 
Douzinas, Lynda Nead, Law and the Image (University of Chicago Press 1999) 124-125. 
8 Philip Wander, ‘The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy’ (1984) vol 70:4 Quarterly Journal of Speech, 339.  
9 Schmitt, Political (n 2) 26. 
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enlarged to be ‘terror’ in general or even a ‘totalitarian ideology’.10 It was thus a new 
unknown, and largely unidentifiable enemy. This was important as it can be said that such 
exceptional circumstances were used to justify new measures in response that were in fact 
in breach of international law. On the other hand, the enemy became more identifiable and 
more ‘traditional’ in the Schmittian sense when ‘one fighting collectivity of people confronts 
a similar collectivity’.11 For example, Osama Bin Laden was made this enemy’s figurehead, 
whilst Saddam Hussein became loosely associated with 9/11 and equally as recognisable 
as ‘the enemy’.12 Bush offers a clear rhetorical friend-enemy grouping based on the 
construction of an ideological distinction that can be recognised both in general through 
the ‘barbaric’ ideology of terrorism, and specifically through individuals’ representative of 
such ideology, who act against the good of America.13 Either way, the enemy can be 
understood in Schmitt’s terms as ‘the other, the stranger’ and ‘existentially something 
different and alien’,14 and there is no middle ground when 'you are either with us or against 
us’.15 Here, Bush almost seems to be speaking with Schmitt’s belief in mind, that: ’if a part 
of the population declares that it no longer recognises enemies, then, depending on the 
circumstance, it joins their side and aids them’.16 Thus, Bush’s war on terror clearly takes 
the Schmittian form of friend against enemy. Within this Schmittian framing of the war on 
terror, it can be said that the quality of legality has little importance: as Donald Rumsfeld 
puts it, ‘I’m not a lawyer. I’m not into that end of the business’.17 The Bush administration 
instead reiterated the need use force against this new form of enemy despite friction with 
                                                 
10 George Bush, ‘Address to the Nation on the Fifth Anniversary of 9/11’ (Washington DC, September 11 
2006). 
11 Schmitt, Political (n 2) 28. 
12 George Bush, ‘State of the Union Address to the 107th Congress’ (Washington DC January 29 2002). 
13 For the use of ‘barbaric’ to describe the enemy, see: George Bush, ‘Address to the Nation on Operations 
in Afghanistan’ (Washington October 7 2001). 
14 Schmitt, Political (n 2) 27. 
15 George Bush, ‘You are Either With Us or Against Us’ CNN (November 6 2001) 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/11/06/gen.attack.on.terror/> accessed July 21 2015. 
16 Schmitt, Political (n 2) 51. 
17 Donald Rumsfeld, quoted in, Judith Butler, Precarious Life (Verso New York 2006) 50. 
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international law given the exceptional circumstances it faced; which is arguably why 
Schmitt’s notion of the ‘state of exception’ became so applicable to Bush’s war on terror.18  
 
 Obama’s Rhetoric of Legality 
 
Obama’s turn towards emphasising the legality of drone strikes indicates a relation 
between ‘legality’ (or more precisely the impression of ‘legality’) and ‘legitimacy’ that was 
not seen under Bush. This is significant because it demonstrates the Obama 
administration’s rhetorical departure from Bush in the context of the war on terror. 
 
Carl Schmitt’s analysis in Legality and Legitimacy – written in relation to the demise of the 
Weimar Republic in Germany – rejects Weber’s division of legitimacy into the three 
sources: traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal,19 critiquing the rational-legal form of 
legitimacy on the basis that ‘legality is neither necessary nor sufficient for legitimacy’.20 
Instead, in John McCormick words, Schmitt believes that legitimacy ‘depends not on the 
overt compliance of those over whom authority is exercised but rather on their choice not 
to resist such authority’, and legality is a non-essential component therein.21 This is 
because Schmitt sees the ‘legal’ to have become ‘something ‘merely formal’ and in 
opposition to the legitimate’.22 Under this formula, ‘legality’ refers to the application of the 
words of the constitution, which in the current context would translate to international legal 
doctrine. By recognising Schmitt’s belief in a ‘separation of law and legal application’, and 
the key role rhetoric plays in drawing attention to the ‘legality’ of the use of force, this 
chapter’s analysis of Obama’s legitimising strategy somewhat reflects Schmitt’s belief that 
                                                 
18 See most prominently: Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (University of Chicago Press 2005) 3-4. 
19 Max Weber, Economy and Society (1968 California University Press). 
20 Eric Posner, Adrian Vermeule, ‘Demystifying Schmitt’ (University of Chicago 2011) 4. 
21 John McCormick, in, Carl Schmitt, John McCormick, Jeffrey Seitzer (eds), Legality and Legitimacy (Duke 
University Press 2004) xxiv. 
22 Carl Schmitt, ibid, 9-10. 
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‘legality’ on its own is not sufficient for legitimacy.23 However, crucially, the ‘legitimacy’ of 
Obama's war on terror should not be understood as in opposition to legality as Schmitt 
believed, since maintaining an impression of legality through rhetoric is key to Obama’s 
legitimising strategy. Obama recognises this role of ‘legality’ in the Audacity of Hope, in 
which he states that, ‘the more international norms were enforced and the more America 
singled a willingness to show restraint in the exercise of its power […] the more legitimate 
our actions would appear in the eyes of the world’.24 Thus, in this contemporary context we 
in fact move away from Schmitt’s understanding of legitimacy because legality is a 
cornerstone of Obama’s represented war on terror. 
 
Given this rhetorical focus on the legality of drone strikes, the strategy of the US 
government now largely reflects Weber’s belief that, ‘the most widely prominent form of 
legitimacy today is the belief in legality’, thus contradicting Schmitt’s explicit refutation of 
this assertion.25 This is because the relationship between legality and legitimacy has to be 
rethought when the context changes. As Cicero remarks: one must ‘adapt his speech to fit 
all conceivable circumstances’.26 The setting of Bush’s war on terror in the immediacy of 
the 9/11 attacks arguably enabled him to take a strongly divisive rhetorical stance in order 
to legitimise the killing of others. Obama’s change in rhetorical strategy thus reflects 
Cicero’s belief that one must adapt to the circumstances: the use of force is no longer in 
the immediacy of 9/11, and is also part of a broader attempt to give the impression that his 
administration adheres to international principles and respects human rights.27 Indeed, 
                                                 
23 ibid, 4. 
24 Barack Obama, The Audacity of Hope (New York: Three Rivers Press 2006) 308. 
25 Weber, quoted in, Schmitt, Legality (n 21), 9. 
26 Cicero, Orator, (Loeb Classical Library Online) para 123. 
27 Barack Obama, ‘Obama’s Speech to the United Nations General Assembly’ The New York Times 
(September 23 2009) <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/24/us/politics/24prexy.text.html?_r=2> accessed 
September 29 2015. 
  21 
Obama’s rhetorical legitimising strategy related to targeted killings reflects this changing 
environment and definitively departs from Bush’s strategy. 
 
The US government’s ability to shape this impression of legality is enhanced by the lack of 
negative commentary from judicial sources on the war on terror. Generally, US domestic 
courts have in fact opted to avoid interference with political matters of such nature. Indeed, 
the Supreme Court in Haig v Agee (1981) decided that ‘matters intimately related to 
foreign policy and national security are rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention’.28 
Following this approach in relation to the killing of a US citizen by a drone strike in Al-
Aulaqi v Panetta (2014), the court ruled that the issue was non-justiciable under the 
‘political question’ doctrine.29 Meanwhile, the US have not recognised the International 
Court of Justice’s (ICJ) jurisdiction under the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
Article 36(2), in relation to any challenge to the drone strike regime – and, 'where a state 
does not consent, the court cannot hear the matter'.30 Thus, the ICJ cannot comment on 
the legality of drone strikes, and domestic courts are ultimately unwilling to do so. This 
means that the Obama administration can construct the impression of legality without 
substantive judicial challenge, or friction with contradicting judicial analysis.  
 
The following three sections in this chapter now analyse Obama’s legitimising strategy – 
with ‘legality’ at its centre – as a means to demonstrate the clear difference to Bush’s 
represented war on terror, and seeming departure from the Schmittian political form. Each 
section relates to a key requirement for a state that wishes to use extra-territorial force that 
                                                 
28 Haig v Agee (1981) 453 U.S. 280. 
29 Al-Aulaqi v Panetta (2014) 35 F.Supp.3d 56. 
30 United States v USSR (1954) ICJ Rep 103. 
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is regarded as legal under international law: that it is in an armed conflict, in self-defence, 
and adheres to the rules for the conduct of war.31 
 
ii. Obama’s Armed Conflict 
 
This section argues that an important component in supporting the impression of legality is 
the Obama administration’s argument that drone strikes are executed as part of an armed 
conflict rather than as a series of law enforcement operations. The significance of the use 
of force being framed as such will first be outlined. This is followed by an analysis of how 
the Obama administration creates this impression: locating drone strikes in the setting of 
the ‘war on terror’, which is supported by domestic judicial and legislative sources, and 
reinforced by the executive’s explicit remarks that drone strike are part of an armed 
conflict. This section then turns to consider challenges to the legality of the CIA’s role in 
this armed conflict, and the US executive’s response which highlights the importance for 
the US government to form an impression of legality. 
 
 An Armed Conflict or Law Enforcement? 
 
The Obama administration appears to recognise the importance of ‘locating’ its use of 
drone strikes within an armed conflict in order to create the impression of a legal war. For 
a state to use force outside its territorial jurisdiction, it must comply with the international 
law relating to armed conflicts or law enforcement operations.32 The distinction between 
the two is significant for the US. Were its targeted killings framed as ‘acts of law 
                                                 
31 Anders Henriksen, ‘Jus ad bellum and American Targeted Use of Force to Fight Terrorism Around the 
World’, (2014) vol 19:2 Journal of Conflict & Security Law. 
32 Law enforcement operations are regulated by international codes of conduct which limit the level of force 
law enforcement officials can use. See, for example: UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials 
(1979), Article 3. Whereas, in an armed conflict a state using force has to comply with rules on the conduct 
of war held in the Geneva Convention. See section iv below for a full analysis. 
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enforcement’, most if not all military strikes would be unlawful, because 'unlike in armed 
conflict, it is never permissible for killing to be the sole objective of an operation. Thus, for 
example, a ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy violates human rights law’,33 meaning that the US 
government would have to significantly minimise the level of force used, for US 
government drone strikes to be understood as part of a law enforcement operation, and 
still considered ‘legal’.34 The rigours of the enforcement paradigm would require the US 
government to alter their current policy and practice: the alternatives of capture or 
warnings are incompatible with the use of drone technology, since drones are unmanned. 
This raises further political problems, since it would require military personnel on the 
ground, far greater scrutiny regarding civilian casualties, and a shift away from the lethal 
intentions of Obama's targeted killing policy. Whereas, within an armed conflict paradigm, 
the US can still use its greater resources to implement lethal force in a way that can be 
framed as ‘legal’. It is therefore important that drone strikes are presented as an armed 
conflict rather than law enforcement for this to occur. 
 
A variety of scholars, news outlets and reporting organisations, however, have contested 
the notion that Obama’s use of drone strikes is part of an armed conflict. Human Rights 
Watch have argued that the war on terror does not take place within a ‘battleground’ so the 
laws of war are simply ‘not applicable’,35 whilst Grégoire Chamayou has argued that drone 
strikes in Yemen and Pakistan are outside the remit of any armed conflict, meaning the 
law of armed conflict would not apply.36 Despite these claims that drone strikes amount to 
a sustained program of extrajudicial killing,37 since 9/11 and more explicitly so since 
                                                 
33 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston’ A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28 2010) 11. 
34 ibid 
35 Human Rights Watch, ‘Letter to Obama on Targeted Killings and Drones’ (2010). 
36 Grégoire Chamayou, Drone Theory (Penguin 2015) 171. 
37 Michael Boyle, ‘Obama’s drone wars and the normalisation of extrajudicial murder’ The Guardian (June 12 
2012) <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jun/11/obama-drone-wars-normalisation-
extrajudicial-killing> accessed September 12 2015. 
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Obama came to office, the US government has maintained that the targeted killing of 
suspected terrorists takes place in an armed conflict. The basis for this interpretation is 
found in drone strikes’ origins in the ‘war’ on terror, bolstered by concerted argument by 
the Obama administration regarding the legality of the armed conflict more generally.38 
 
 The Impression of War 
 
The representation of drone strikes as operating within the context of an armed conflict is 
corroborated by their framing as uses of force that form part of the post-9/11 ‘war’ on 
terror. Specifically, the ‘official-level rhetorical construction’ of the ‘War on Terror’ by senior 
members of the administration has introduced and reinforced the idea that the use of force 
was part of a ‘war’.39 For instance, Donald Rumsfeld in the months following 9/11 stated 
that ‘we did not start the war; the terrorists started it when they attacked the United 
States’.40 Such rhetoric worked to ‘cue a whole series of conscious and unconscious 
thoughts and feelings about September 11th’.41 This not only set the scene of armed 
conflict, but also positions the US as the innocent victim, and reluctant participant. This 
representation from senior members was taken up and replicated by military officials, one 
of whom stated that there ‘should be no doubt, we are at war, and it is a world war. There 
is simply no other way to put it’.42 It can be said that this frequently used terminology of a 
                                                 
38 In particular, see: Harold Koh, ‘The Obama Administration and International Law’, The US Department of 
State, (March 25 2010) < http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm> accessed February 11 
2015. 
39 Joanne Esch, ‘Legitimizing the “War on Terror”: Political Myth in Official-Level Rhetoric’ (2010) vol 31:3 
Political Psychology, 358. 
40 Donald Rumsfeld, ‘Rumsfeld Says Taliban to Blame for Casualties’ (October 29 2001) 
<http://www.usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/peace/archives/2001/october/103004.html> accessed 
September 12 2015. 
41 Robert Entman, ‘Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House’s Frame after 9/11’ (2003) vol 20 
Political Communication, 416. 
42 Melshen quoted in, Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism (Manchester University Press 2005) 9. 
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‘war’ against terrorists supports the notion that the use of drones is part of an ongoing 
armed conflict rather than a series of police operations.43  
 
The rhetoric of armed conflict has also been enshrined in legislative instruments such as 
the Military Commissions Act (2006). In the process of setting up trials by military 
commissions, the US legislature gave clear indications that the ongoing use of force was 
an armed conflict, with such terminology consistently used to describe Bush’s use of force 
in response to 9/11. Moreover, although domestic courts have mostly been unwilling to 
interfere with political matters concerning the war on terror as recognised above, in 
Hamdan v Rumsfeld (2006), the Supreme Court did confirm, albeit indirectly, the opinion of 
the Bush administration that the use of force in response to 9/11 is an armed conflict.44 
The Court also remarked that Obama’s ongoing use of drones strikes are part of a non-
international armed conflict (NIAC), supporting the US government’s contention that, 
outside of Afghanistan, the US is not fighting against other sovereign states,45 but a less 
concretely identifiable enemy, as the person(s) under international law ‘who, either lawfully 
or unlawfully, engages in hostilities for the opposing side in an international armed 
conflict’.46 This is again crucial for Obama in maintaining the impression of legal operations 
against so-called terrorists.  
 
This apparent consensus that uses of force in response to 9/11 are within an armed 
conflict was reached prior to Obama taking office. His administration has subsequently 
shifted away from explicit usage of the phrase ‘war on terror’ whilst reaffirming that drone 
                                                 
43 Charlie Savage, ‘Obama’s War on Terror May Resemble Bush’s in Some Areas’ New York Times 
(February 17 2009) <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/18/us/politics/18policy.html> accessed September 12 
2015. 
44 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006) 548 U.S. 557. 
45 The relevant treaty provision for a NIAC is Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
Geneva Convention (12 August 1949). 
46 ICRC, ’The relevance of IHL in the context of terrorism’ (January 1 2011) 
<https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/terrorism-ihl-210705.htm> accessed December 29 
2015. 
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strikes take place in an armed conflict,47 which supports the Obama administration’s ‘legal’ 
representation. This approach is typified by US Department of State Legal Advisor Harold 
Koh when using the term ‘armed conflict’ throughout a speech in reference to the legality 
of the ongoing lethal responses to 9/11, whilst not once referring to the ‘war on terror’.48 
The Obama administration presents a more direct legal argument in its legitimation of the 
use of drones, perhaps reflecting Costas Douzinas’ belief that; ‘whether a war is legal 
under international law remains of great importance’.49 
 
Although Obama continues to pursue Bush’s global ‘war’ against individuals either 
deemed responsible for 9/11 or suspected as terrorists, the ‘rhetoric of the two 
administrations is markedly different’.50 This is particularly evident in Obama’s shift away 
from the Manichean divide of Bush’s war on terror, underlined through his ‘recurring use of 
words such as evil’ to describe the enemy.51 Instead, with the help of legislation and some 
judicial affirmations, Obama consistently reinforces that the use of force takes place within 
an armed conflict, and is therefore legal. 
 
The CIA in this ‘Armed Conflict’ 
 
Critics who perceive an incompatibility between the US government’s targeted killing 
program and the requirements of an ‘armed conflict’ also raise direct challenges regarding 
the role of the CIA. Jane Mayer distinguishes between two US drone regimes, one that 
‘operates in the recognised war zones of Afghanistan and Iraq, and targets enemies of 
U.S. troops stationed there’, and a separate CIA program ‘aimed at terror suspects around 
                                                 
47 Koh, (n 38). 
48 ibid 
49 Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire (Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 213. 
50 Michael Desch, ‘The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: The Liberal Tradition and 
Obama’s Counterterrorism Policy’ (2010) vol 43:3 Political Science and Politics, 425. 
51 Entman, (n 41) 417. 
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the world, including in countries where U.S. troops are not based’, to which Chamayou is 
referring in his comments above regarding the use of force outside of an armed conflict.52 
If one accepts the Obama administration’s framing of drone strikes as a part of an armed 
conflict, the legality of the CIA’s role in executing targeted killings is squarely brought into 
question.53 The CIA may be deemed unlawful combatants if they operate within a war 
zone without uniforms or insignia.54 Against such arguments, how does the CIA legitimise 
its role in Obama’s war on terror in conjunction with the wider strategy of the US 
government in presenting the war on terror as ‘legal’? 
 
The answer, which will not be surprising, is that the Obama administration present the CIA 
to carry out legal uses of force via the drone; underlining the significance of ‘legality’ within 
the US government’s legitimising strategy. This approach signals a departure from the 
Bush administration’s exceptionalist rhetoric, exemplified by then Secretary of State 
Condoleeza Rice’s belief that the ‘Geneva Conventions should not apply to terrorists like 
Al Qaeda’,55 and reiterated by Bush’s remarks that ‘captured terrorists cannot use the 
Geneva Conventions’.56 Effectively, the Bush administration introduces the idea that law is 
not entirely relevant to this exceptional war against a new kind of enemy. In contrast, the 
Obama administration gives clear indications that it adheres to the relevant law. As current 
Defence Secretary Leon Panetta states: drone strikes are ‘legitimate if we followed the 
                                                 
52 Jane Mayer, ‘The Predator War What are the risks of the C.I.A.’s covert drone program?’ The New Yorker 
(October 26 2009) <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/10/26/the-predator-war> accessed May 11 
2015. 
53 ibid 
54'Unlawful/unprivileged combatant/belligerent' is understood as describing all persons taking a direct part in 
hostilities without being entitled to do so , in,  nut D rmann, ‘The legal situation of 'unlawful/unprivileged 
combatants’, (2003) International Review of the Red Cross vol 85. 
55 Condoleeza Rice, ‘Rice Refuses to Describe Detainee Abuse at Abu Ghraib As Torture’ (January 19 2005) 
<http://www.democracynow.org/2005/1/19/rice_refuses_to_describe_detainee_abuse> accessed January 22 
2016. 
56 George Bush, Address on the Creation of Military Commissions To Try Suspected Terrorists’ (Washington, 
September 6 2006). 
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law’,57 and according to Panetta, the CIA do in fact fully comply with ‘the legal 
requirements to ensure that we were doing this carefully’.58 The notion that the program is 
in breach of international law is simply disregarded, by the assertion that if the CIA follow 
the law, then drone strikes are legitimate, as indeed, the CIA do.  
 
However, it must be noted that the US executive does not deny the role of the CIA so as to 
shield the organisation from such legal challenges. As Derek Gregory recognises, 
‘ironically, we know much more about the impact of the CIA’s ‘secret war’ than military 
operations in Afghanistan.59 This fact notwithstanding, on a case by case basis ‘the line 
between the CIA and the military is deliberately blurred’, meaning that it would be difficult 
in practice to challenge the legality of a specific CIA drone strike.60 Thus, the US 
government’s drone strike regime – whether military or CIA – may operate in friction with 
international law, yet is legitimised through the political justifications of such force, 
consistently supported by political assertions that regardless of such friction, these 
operations are ‘legal’. 
 
The rhetorical representation of the CIA’s specific role in executing drone strikes is 
cohesive with Obama’s broader strategy of embellishing vice with the virtue of legality. 
Whereas Bush’s rhetoric defended breaches of international law given the exceptional 
circumstances requiring such measures, the Obama administration refute this assertion 
regarding the status of the use of force within an armed conflict and the role of the CIA 
therein. Obama’s rhetoric therefore completely shifts away from Bush’s rhetorical strategy 
                                                 
57 Leon Panetta, ‘My Mission Has Always Been To Keep The Country Safe’ NPR (February 3 2013) 
<http://www.npr.org/2013/02/03/170970194/panetta-my-mission-has-always-been-to-keep-the-country-safe> 
accessed September 20 2015. 
58 Leon Panetta, quoted in, Sean Sullivan, ‘Panetta Defends Drone Strikes’ Washington Post (February 3 
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in the war on terror towards a focus on its legality; reflecting Weber’s belief that legitimacy 
is contingent on a belief in ‘legality’.61 As the next section shows, this trend of a rhetorical 
difference and focus on legality is apparent even when Obama utilises similar techniques 
as Bush in the practice of war. 
 
iii. Drone Strikes in Self-defence 
 
In this section it is argued that Obama draws attention to the supposed legality and 
necessity of pre-emptive drone strikes in order to further support this presentation of the 
use of force as legal. This rhetorical representation occurs despite perceived 
incompatibilities between the US government’s use of drone strikes and the requirements 
for self-defence under international law. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the Security 
Council recognised that the US could use force under Article 51 of the UN Charter.62 
However, through a brief overview of the components of section 51, and on closer 
inspection of Obama’s targeted killing program, it is shown that the US government’s use 
of force far exceeds these requirements. Significantly, the Obama administration 
rhetorically constructs the appearance that drone strikes are necessary due to the 
changing nature of the threat they serve to counter, their conflict with dominant 
understandings of self-defence in international law notwithstanding. 
 
 Requirements for Self-defence 
 
It is important to set out the requirements of self-defence at international law in order to go 
on to evaluate the points of friction with Obama’s drone strike program. However, it is 
unnecessary to dwell on the requirement that the state seeking to use self-defence must 
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be the victim of a significant attack or use of force, because, in Resolution 1373, the 
Security Council has deemed the attacks of 9/11 to be significant enough to warrant self-
defence.63 
 
The second requirement demands that the state against which force is used must be 
responsible for the original attack. This does pose a challenge to Obama’s representation 
of current uses of lethal force as ‘legal’. Whilst initial evidence was released to show a 
close connection between al Qaeda and the Taliban which supposedly supported the use 
of force in Afghanistan in accordance with Article 51,64 the use of force via drone strike 
under the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001) has since become global, having 
spread to Yemen, Pakistan, Iraq, and Somalia.65 When the use of force goes beyond the 
territorial jurisdiction of the original perpetrating state, the US has two options for rendering 
its ‘self-defence’ lawful. The US can first obtain permission from the host state.66 The 
strikes undertaken in Yemen have the permission of the Yemeni government,67 as Obama 
confirmed in a letter to the speaker of the House of Representatives.68 There is also a 
similar level of cooperation between US and Pakistani governments, as the Pakistani 
government has supposedly consented to drone strikes executed by the US on their 
territory.69 If there is no such consent, or, in Harold  oh’s terms, if there is unwillingness or 
inability ‘of those states to suppress the threat the target poses', the US, Koh asserts, can 
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invoke its right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.70 This circular guarantee 
that the US can intervene in any location without violating international law claims support 
from the assertion that there is no authority to suggest that ‘when one of the parties to an 
armed conflict plans and executes operations from a base in a new nation, an operation to 
engage the enemy in that location cannot be part of the original armed conflict’.71 
Therefore, the Obama administration offers assurances regarding its targeted killing 
regime in relation to self-defence that are located centrally within the language and domain 
of international law. 
 
The third component for self-defence in international law offers the most significant point of 
difficulty for the US government, and has necessitated a specific rhetorical strategy on the 
part of both the Bush and Obama administration. The right to use self-defence requires 
that the armed attack to which the act of self-defence is a response must be underway, or 
else there must be clear evidence that there are more attacks planned by the intended 
target. Under the oft-cited customary law existing prior to the enactment of the UN Charter 
– the Caroline Doctrine – the party wanting to use self-defence is not necessarily required 
to wait for that attack to occur. Self-defence may be exercised pre-emptively if the need for 
it is in that ‘instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberation’.72 However, the Caroline Doctrine’s interpretation of self-defence is arguably 
incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations (1945). On a prima facie reading of 
section 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, which states that nothing shall impair a 
state’s right to self-defence ‘if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
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Nations’, self-defence ought not to be available where an attack is merely expected to 
occur. Debates have subsequently emerged as to whether the charter is exhaustive of the 
situation in which self-defence can be used, or whether self-defence can be used pre-
emptively and thus the customary law the Caroline Doctrine exemplifies, prevails. Whilst a 
full analysis of this debate is beyond the scope and requirements of this thesis, it is 
nonetheless important to consider the arguments of each side in order to understand 
where drone strikes are situated within this debate, and how the US government 
legitimises this position. 
 
Proponents of a right to pre-emptive self-defence – including in the case of drone strikes, 
according to many commentators73 – rely upon an expansive reading of Article 51. The 
‘inherent right’ to use force is understood as referring to earlier customary law that allowed 
self-defence to be anticipatory.74 The term ‘armed attack’ is read expansively to include the 
planning, logistics and preparation stages for an attack.75 Moreover, in a similar reliance 
upon the ‘inherent right’, it has been argued that the Charter does not remove any right 
found previously under customary law. Judge Stephen Schwebel’s dissenting judgment in 
the Nicaragua case supports this view, in which he states that ‘I do not agree that the 
terms or intent of Article 51 eliminate the right of self-defence under customary 
international law, or confine its entire scope to the express terms of Article 51’.76 On this 
interpretation the right to pre-emptive self-defence would prevail despite the wording of the 
UN Charter. 
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Contrastingly, those who take the prima facie reading of Article 51 see that the only 
exception to force included in the UN Charter was not a ‘novel development’ and thus, in 
line with customary understandings in 1945, ‘self-defence was understood to be justified 
only in case of an attack by the forces of a state’.77 The veracity of the argument that the 
pre-emptive right present in customary law supersedes subsequent international treaties, 
is also challenged due to its conflict with the very nature of the UN Charter. Why would the 
drafters ‘create this regime’, so goes the challenge, ‘if the article was intended to be 
merely a declaration of the customary law?’78 Accordingly, the ‘natural and logical 
conclusion’ is that under the rule of jus cogens, the ‘treaty will prevail’.79 
 
 Setting a New Standard of Pre-emptive Self-defence 
 
Although the above discussion shows that there appears to be ‘no clear agreement on the 
legality of the doctrine’ regarding pre-emption, I here argue that pre-emptive killing in 
supposed self-defence by drone strikes exceeds both understandings of legal self-defence 
set out above.80 This is because of the notion of ‘imminence’ central to the use of both 
‘personnel strikes’ and ‘signature strikes’. As discussed in more detail below, both major 
kinds of targeted killing by drone strikes are at ends with recognised standards of self-
defence in international law, contrary to the Obama administration’s rhetoric that tends to 
emphasise their legality. 
 
Despite the ongoing use of force at times being presented as part of the war against the 
perpetrators of 9/11, the ‘attacks on 11 September 2001 can no longer serve as a basis for 
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an American right to self-defence’, because, put simply, 9/11 is not an ongoing armed 
attack.81 As Obama himself has said, al-Qaeda and associated forces have ‘not carried out 
a successful attack on our homeland since 9/11’.82 Instead, as Obama also recognises, 
drone strikes are a way to ‘prevent terror’.83 By this very understanding, drone strikes are 
executed in pre-emption of potential future threats are therefore a continuation of Bush’s 
military strategy in the war on terror. The Bush administration’s strategy to ‘stop rogue 
states and their terrorists’ clients’84 formed the basis of what has become known as the 
‘Bush Doctrine’.85 This doctrine’s creative interpretation of self-defence – acting pre-
emptively against supposed ‘threats’ – is evidently now key to Obama’s use of drone 
strikes. In fact, the Obama administration has markedly increased the number of pre-
emptive strikes compared to the Bush’s administration.86 As Jeremy Scahill remarks, whilst 
the pre-emptive use of force in the war on terror was introduced by Bush, it was ‘ultimately 
legitimised and expanded’ by Obama.87 Thus, Obama’s ‘rhetorical imprecision’ discussed 
in the next section ‘obscures’ this reality that ‘behind the fog is the Bush Doctrine’.88  
 
The US government’s own understanding of ‘immanence’, that establishes whether a 
strike can go ahead, itself demonstrates the inherently pre-emptive nature of ‘self-defence’ 
in Obama’s war on terror. The policy that a drone strike is executed if an attack against the 
US is ‘immanent’ appears to conform to the Caroline Doctrine’s requirement that self-
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defence must be ‘instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment of 
deliberation’.89 However, the US government’s definition of ‘imminence’, found in a 
Department of Justice White Paper, shows a far more expansive understanding of the 
term. The paper states that ‘the US government may not be aware of all al-Qaeda plots as 
they are developing and thus cannot be confident that none is about to occur’, so 
immanence does not ‘require the United States to have clear evidence that a specific 
attack on US persons and interests will take place in the immediate future’.90 This is a 
circular, self-justifying argument whereby the US may carry out strikes if a plot is known, 
but can also do so if there is not a known plot; which is why the US’s interpretation has 
been termed ‘Orwellian’.91 This notion of immanence certainly surpasses even the widest 
reading of pre-emptive self-defence by establishing that strikes can be executed against 
targets that may not even pose a threat. When directed by such understandings of ‘self-
defence’, both personnel and signature strikes exceed the remit of self-defence outlined 
above. 
 
Whether a particular drone strike comes within the remit of ‘self-defence’ will always 
depend to some degree on the threat to which the strike was a response, and the precise 
basis on which the use of force was considered necessary. But, I suggest, in neither so-
called ‘signature strikes’ which target individuals based on characteristics associated with 
‘terrorist behaviour’, nor ‘personnel strikes’ which target known individuals on a ‘kill-list’, 
can the US’s targeted killings be cogently argued to fall within the remit of self-defence in 
international law.92 
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The killing of Anwar Al-Aulaqi provides an example of the incongruence of personnel 
drone strikes with orthodox legal interpretations of self-defence. The drone strike that killed 
Al-Aulaqi and two others, led to a legal challenge against the US government in Al-Aulaqi v 
Panetta (2014), on the basis that the killings violated the US Constitution’s guarantee of 
due process under the Fifth Amendment.93 The US government’s defence revealed that 
the strike was undertaken because Al-Aulaqi ‘posed a continuing and imminent threat of 
violent attack against the United States’ and ‘it was not feasible to capture him’.94 The US 
government’s central claim against Al-Aulaqi was that he ‘helped oversee the 2010 plot to 
detonate explosive devices on two U.S. bound cargo planes’.95 This would in fact suggest 
that the killing of Al-Aulaqi was a punishment, and therefore part of a law enforcement 
operation, which, since there had been no trial, would amount to an extra-judicial killing. 
On the one hand, this underlines the importance to the Obama regime of framing drone 
strikes as part of an armed conflict and for judicial opinion not to confute this classification. 
Yet it also shows the transition of self-defence to its current pre-emptive character. Given 
the US government’s current definition of ‘immanence’, the uses of force via drone strikes 
appears to far exceed even an expansive understanding of the right to self-defence under 
international law. 
 
This situation is perhaps even clearer in the case of so-called ‘signature strikes’. Whereas 
personnel drone strikes target a known individual, signature strikes, as Klaidman explains, 
target individuals or ‘groups of men who bear certain signatures, or defining characteristics 
associated with terrorist activity, but whose identities aren’t known’.96 Thus, as is shown 
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clearly in the example in the following chapter, signature strikes by their very nature 
involve a form of lethal force that is not determined by the immanence of the threat an 
individual or group poses, but is merely based upon their appearance or ‘profiles’.97 It is 
thus reasonable to contend that signature strikes regularly exceed the principles of self-
defence even under the most expansive reading of Article 51, as this form of lethal force is 
not undertaken when there is ‘no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation’.98 
These two forms of drone strikes indicate the difference between current US military 
practices in the war on terror and previously dominant understandings of self-defence, 
since the US now primarily execute ‘pre-emptive’ strikes against suspected terrorists. It 
follows that 'one can reasonably conclude that the emerging threat doctrine conflicts with 
both the UN Charter an also the pre-Charter customary law’.99 
 
 Legitimising the Shift to a New Standard of Self-defence 
 
Bush and Obama’s legitimised this departure from orthodox interpretations of the UN 
Charter in different ways. Bush’s original justification for pre-emptive force recognised the 
newness of the situation and the corresponding need to act differently from before. 
Following this, Obama then utilises Bush's pre-emptive self-defence innovation in drawing 
attention to the legality of his administration’s use of force. But as we will see below, 
Obama also departs from Bush’s rhetorical stance by putting forward justifications that are 
particular to his use of drone strikes. This creates the impression of a well-judged and 
considered response to threats faced, which can be seen as a response to the criticism 
that Bush’s wars were ill-judged and imprecise, backed by a manichean world view.100 
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According to Bush, it was necessary to adapt the concept of an imminent threat because: 
 
Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. The greater the 
threat, the greater the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory 
action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s 
attack.101 
 
Here, Bush justifies the shift away from the customary law approach to pre-emptive 
strikes. The requirement to act despite uncertainty in regards to the imminence or 
whereabouts of the attack is due to the potential significance of the threat faced. Bush 
reinforces that the new enemy does not adhere to normal practices of war, whilst 
simultaneously reminding the public of the surprise and unconventional nature of 9/11, 
which may be repeated without pre-emptive military intervention.  
 
Bush’s justifications for pre-emptive self-defence subsequently become engrained in post-
9/11 security approaches. By the time Obama takes office, it appears unnecessary for him 
to make direct justifications regarding this approach to self-defence as it has become a 
common feature of ‘western’ security discourses. Paul Wilkinson, for instance has 
identified the need for pre-emption when new ‘terrorism groups are based on transnational 
networks of cells, preparative cells, affiliated groups and support networks’ which ‘have 
multinational composition’.102 The security threats now faced by Western states are 
represented as less identifiable and more dispersed than those mounted by previous 
enemies, which is why pre-emptive attacks are simply the new form of self-defence. 
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Indeed, as Ulrich Beck has stated, it is ‘precisely because of the uncontrollable nature of 
risks that pre-mediation is culturally so appealing’.103 Following from Bush’s consistent 
assertion of this necessity to act first since 9/11, Obama’s rhetoric is squarely located 
within this discourse of pre-emption. It can be said that this setting helps to give the US 
administration a ‘carte blanche to conduct war wherever it ‘anticipates’ its suspect targets 
might lurk’.104 
 
Although both president’s uses of force and communications are both located within this 
pre-emptive frame, Obama’s precise rhetorical representation of pre-emptive self-defence 
is subtly, and at times explicitly different to Bush’s. Because Bush effectively lays the 
foundations for an apparently more timely response to threats with pre-emptive self-
defence, the Obama administration can focus upon the legality of this use of force without 
Bush’s archetypal fear-based rhetoric. On the one hand, the Obama administration utilises 
the language introduced by Bush to support the represented legality of drone strike 
operations. As State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh asserts, targeted killings ‘will 
depend upon considerations specific to each case, including those related to the 
imminence of the threat’.105 The language Bush deployed is here used by Koh to reiterate 
the war on terror’s legality. On the other, Obama does not use the same divisive war-like 
language that Bush did, explicitly shown in his call that ‘we must take the battle to the 
enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge’.106 Obama 
instead consistently asserts that the use of force is always ‘in last resort’ and in ‘self-
defence’ so ‘America’s actions are legal’.107 Here, the Obama administration’s 
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representation of pre-emptive self-defence in the war on terror is markedly less conflictual 
than Bush’s and robustly more legalistic and considered. 
 
This ‘considered’ dimension to Obama’s rhetoric is underlined by his administration’s focus 
on the operational qualities of the drone program perhaps intentionally set against the view 
that Bush’s wars were ill-judged and fought with a lack of intelligence.108 Bush’s own 
framing of his decision to invade Iraq supports this argument, as he states that ‘we cannot 
wait for the final proof – the smoking gun – that could come in the form of a mushroom 
cloud’.109 Contrastingly, Obama’s rhetoric is tailored to justifying his targeted killing 
program via the drone. This creates the impression of a ‘considered’ and well-measured 
form of self-defence. Obama represents the use of force in such a way that it appears to 
aptly respond to the nature of the enemy being fought against: he states that the threat 
has ‘shifted and evolved from the one that came to our shores on 9/11’, as it is today ‘more 
diffuse’ with al-Qaeda affiliates now reaching beyond several state borders.110 Following 
improved cross-country ‘intelligence’ measures, the US military are then able to narrowly 
target these enemies, rather than requiring unnecessary troop deployment in such 
areas.111 This rhetorical strategy therefore supports the specific use of drone strikes to 
respond to this new form of enemy. Obama avoids Bush's war-like language of targeting 
the enemy before they target ‘us’ without the relevant evidence if necessary. He instead 
constructs the impression of a reasonable and practical strategy backed by intelligence. 
This juxtaposition suggests that under Obama there has been a departure from the blindly 
fought wars backed by American exceptionalism in the Bush era.112 Thus, although the 
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Obama administration’s pre-emptive practices can certainly be criticised in the same vein 
as Bush’s were, Obama’s rhetorical style and focus creates a point of contrast to Bush’s 
war on terror.113 
 
In conclusion to this section, Obama’s rhetoric relating to the threats faced by the US 
supports the transition away from conventional understandings of self-defence, in a 
rhetorical form that attempts to protect the impression of legality. Central to the 
legitimisation of this shift in practice, is a line of public communications that disguises vice 
as virtue by reenforcing the need to respond with force appropriate for the new threats of 
the globalised world, and in a way that is ‘legal’. Thus, it is apparent that the US has a key 
role in determining the scope of its own practices due to the seeming malleability of 
international law. This demonstrates the way in which the ‘words of the constitution [or in 
this instance international law principles] gain meaning and authority as shared political 
meaning’.114 This is crucial for the rhetorical turn away from Bush’s divisive strategy. But it 
is also apparent that below this embellishment is an evolution of Bush era practices that 
constructs political relations in ways unseen through the Obama administration’s rhetoric. 
 
iv. Legitimate Targeting with Precise Weaponry 
 
This final section argues that the Obama administration emphasises the technical qualities 
of the drone, apparently in response to criticism from media reports regarding the precision 
of drone strikes in relation to norms regarding the issues of ‘distinction’ and ‘proportionality’ 
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in the use of lethal force.115 This element of the rhetorical representation of the drone strike 
supports the impression that the use of force is legal and humanely executed. On this 
basis, Obama frames the method used to fight the war on terror and the political problem 
of civilian casualties differently from Bush. This impression of a humane use of force 
directly contradicts the ‘dehumanising’ effect of drone strikes exposed in the following 
chapter. 
 
 Media Criticism 
 
Media reports increasingly highlight the failure of the US’s targeted killing program to 
adhere to the requirements of international law, which have made a great deal of the high 
number of civilian casualities.116 How does the Obama Administration respond to these 
contestations and maintain the legitimacy of the drone campaign? As we see below, the 
Obama administration asserts that targeting is proportionate and considerate of civilians at 
all times. The drone is praised for its precision, and presented as having been chosen as 
the best option for reducing casualties when executing necessary lethal action. But the 
Obama administration also denies or contests the accuracy of casualty figures, whilst 
accepting the simple fact that civilian casualties are inevitable in war despite their best 
efforts in avoiding such consequences. 
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Mainstream media outlets, and specialised campaigns have criticised the lack of judicial 
accountability for the ‘civilian casualties’ caused by drone strikes.117 The sheer number of 
casualties, too, has been grounds for concern: the Bureau of Investigative Journalism 
(TBIJ) reports that in Pakistan alone, from 2004 up to 2015, between 416 and 959 civilians 
were killed by US drone strikes.118 This indicates that US drone strikes may be in breach 
of the rules of proportionality and distinction. The rules of ‘distinction’ and ‘proportionality’ 
under international law relate to the treatment of civilians in war, and restrict what and 
whom an attacking state can target. The rules of proportionality aim to protect the civilian 
population, but only to a certain degree as the Geneva Convention prohibits force ‘which 
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to 
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to concrete 
and direct military advantage anticipated’.119 Distinction then requires a state using force to 
‘at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants, and between 
civilian objects and military objectives’, and to ‘direct their operations only against military 
objectives’.120 
 
Precise and Proportionate 
 
As these principles indicate, the presence of civilian casualties can certainly undermine the 
impression of legality. As such, when the US government asserts that it exercises a great 
deal of care to avoid civilians it can be seen as part of a broader attempt to show that the 
war on terror is now a legal war. The Obama administration creates the impression that its 
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targeted killing regime is carefully executed in a way that is proportionate and always 
mindful of the possibility of civilian casualties. As Obama states, ‘there must be near-
certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured — the highest standard we can set’;121 a 
representation that closely mirrors the requirements of proportionality outlined in the 
Additional Protocol of the Geneva Convention above. Panetta reinforces the notion that 
the US take great care to avoid civilians by stating that, ‘as a Catholic […] I was making 
life-and-death decisions […] you gotta make sure that we really are focused on somebody 
who is, you know, who is a direct threat’.122 Whereas Panetta seeks to represent the 
practice as being morally considered, Koh more closely follows Obama’s approach by 
asserting that drone killings are coherent with international law standards of 
proportionality. He states how the ‘planning and execution’ is rigorously guided by 
principles of proportionality ‘to ensure that such operations are conducted in accordance 
with all applicable law’.123 Effectively, questions of proportionality are met by the depiction 
of the drone strike as directed by considerations of civilians on the ground, constructing 
the impression of a use of force that is both legally regimented and morally guided. In 
short, there is a consistent foundation of ‘legality’, which is bolstered by the executive’s 
concerted representations of the principles underpinning targeted killings in Obama’s war 
on terror. 
 
The drone’s perceived precision supports this impression that the numbers of civilian 
casualties are reduced due to the use of the drone. This is shown in the suggestion that 
drones are capable of pinpointing a particular target; putting ‘warheads on foreheads’,124 
and, as a US Lieutenant-Colonel has claimed, the US can now 'control collateral damage 
to a much greater degree' through not being restrained by fuel shortages or crew 
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tiredness.125 The drone’s perceived precision entails that the US government can assert 
that they achieve ‘military objectives efficiently and humanely because they limited 
collateral damage’.126 I interrogate the true effect of this belief in ‘precision’ in the second 
chapter. Nevertheless, it is clear that by consistently presenting the medium as enabling 
civilian casualties to be minimised, the Obama administration strengthen its key claim that 
drone strikes are legal. 
 
This support for the medium of the drone is reinforced by Obama’s strategy comparing 
drones against alternative weaponry. Although drones are beset by possible inaccuracy, 
Obama emphasises that ‘conventional airpower or missiles are far less precise than 
drones, and are likely to cause more civilian casualties and more local outrage’.127 So the 
drone is the most humane and civilian friendly option when ‘measured against’ other US 
foreign policy adventures, such as Vietnam, where ‘hundreds of thousands of civilians died 
in a war where the boundaries of battle were blurred’, and Iraq and Afghanistan, where 
‘despite the extraordinary courage and discipline of our troops, thousands of civilians have 
been killed’.128 Thus, on the one hand, this technique presumes the necessity of lethal 
force. On the other, the drone’s lethality is made relative by comparing the medium with 
other uses of force that have resulted in high numbers of civilian casualties; which helps 
emphasise the drone’s virtues. 
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 Distinction 
 
But because drone strikes do at times kill civilians, in order to maintain an impression of 
legality, the Obama administration also utilises the exception to the rule of distinction that 
‘civilians’ become legitimate targets when 'they take a direct part in hostilities’.129 This 
possible transition of the civilian into a legitimate target allows the attacking state force 
some scope to argue that a given civilian death was a legitimate target, and therefore 
helps the US government to maintain the impression that the use of drone strikes are 
legal. 
 
The lack of clear distinction between who is and who is not a civilian therefore forms a line 
of defence for Obama in response to such claims. Obama states in practical and non-
emotive language that ‘there’s a wide gap between U.S. assessments of such casualties 
and nongovernmental reports’,130 but he does not explain the source of this discrepancy. It 
is unclear whether it concerns the definition of casualties as civilians, or whether he simply 
contests the number of civilian casualties drone strikes cause. This taciturn approach 
withholds from critics any clear ground on which to impugn the administration’s 
‘assessments’. Nonetheless, in the same speech, Obama does recognise the existence of 
civilian casualties from drone strikes, presenting them as ‘a risk that exists in every war’; 
thus normalising them as an inevitable byproduct of conflict in general rather than a fault of 
the particular use of drones or US foreign policy.131 Essentially, where war is fought in 
locations with civilians, and particularly when war is fought predominantly in the air, the 
distinction between legitimate target and civilian is inevitably unclear. Despite this 
concession, Obama reaffirms  oh’s line of argument that ‘only legitimate objectives are 
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targeted’,132 stating that ‘we only target al Qaeda and its associated forces’.133 The US 
military’s broad understanding of a legitimate target to include any ‘military aged male’ 
(spoken of in military dialect as a ‘MAM’) shows how the US government can make such 
assertions regarding the legitimacy of their targeting practices.134 This use of ‘MAM’ has a 
similar guilty by association glaze as the contention that civilians forfeit their right to 
protection when they ‘refuse to separate themselves from the local population’.135 In both 
instances, the blurring between civilian and legitimate target is evident, in a way that 
attempts not to offend the principle of distinction. The ‘civilian’ casualty is transformed into 
a legitimate target; again helping to support the Obama administration’s assertion that 
drone strikes are ‘legal’. 
 
 Difference to Bush 
 
On this basis Obama takes a completely different approach to Bush when addressing the 
problem of civilian casualties. Although Bush did also emphasise the effectiveness of US 
military technology, this is simply to emphasise the ability of the US to win the war, 
claiming that ‘expensive precision weapons defeat the enemy’.136 The consequence of 
civilian casualties appears to be of less importance to Bush, as it is a topic rarely directly 
addressed in his public communications. When Bush does however confront the issue of 
civilian deaths this demonstrates the clear difference to Obama’s approach set out above. 
He first places the blame elsewhere, illustrated in his assertion that: ‘Saddam Hussein has 
placed Iraqi troops and equipment in civilian areas, attempting to use innocent men, 
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women and children as shields for his own military — a final atrocity against his people’.137 
Evidence of civilian casualties is utilised as a rhetorical tool against the enemy. In further 
contrast to the Obama’s approach, civilian casualties are used as one of several 
indications of a well fought war, shown in his remarks that ‘a year later, high profile terrorist 
attacks are down, civilian deaths are down, sectarian killings are down’.138 Put simply, 
while Bush does not offer any real show of care for such deaths, Obama has clearly 
moved from this position by recognising the importance of civilian casualties in media 
reports, and their role in challenging the representation of a legal war: putting the issue at 
the forefront of his communications. 
 
This section has illustrated that Obama’s representation of the drone’s technical qualities 
supports the attempt to form an impression of a legal war. Targeted killings are 
represented to be regimented by relevant legal requirements, and are carefully undertaken 
so as to only strike legitimate targets. The medium of the drone significantly helps towards 
such ends by supposedly minimising collateral victims thanks to its ‘precision’. Obama’s 
representation of the use of force therefore corresponds to the legal requirements for the 
conduct of war. This shows Obama’s clear transition away from Bush’s rhetorical approach 
in his war on terror. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored the Obama administration’s strategy for legitimising drone 
strikes in order to demonstrate the difference between Bush’s and Obama’s war on terror 
at the point of representation. Contrasting with Bush’s strategy, the Obama administration 
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rhetorically constructs the impression that the war on terror now adheres to international 
law and is considerate of civilian casualties in areas targeted. This is distinctly unlike 
Bush’s representation of the war on terror that focused on the exceptional circumstances 
faced by the US, and also does not appear to be similarly Schmittian. This argument has 
been developed through an analysis of three conditions for legitimate state force in relation 
to the Obama administration’s rhetorical strategy. The first condition examined was the 
importance of drone strikes being in an armed conflict as opposed to a law enforcement 
operation. The Obama administration consistently presents the use of force to be within an 
armed conflict, which is supported by judicial and legislative sources. Here we saw the 
difference to the Bush administration’s calls that the law should not always apply in the war 
against terrorists. The second condition analysed was the requirements for self-defence, 
which showed one of the key points of friction between conventional interpretations of 
international law and the use of drone strikes in practice. The US government’s shift 
towards pre-emptive self-defence following 9/11 was shown to be embellished by rhetoric 
focusing upon the necessity of the use of force in response to the new form of threat facing 
the US. Obama thus followed Bush’s line of rhetoric whilst adding a more robust ‘legal’ 
dimension. The third and final condition related to challenges regarding the precision of the 
drone, and the rules of distinction and proportionality. The Obama administration 
emphasises the legality of its practices and the related avoidance of civilians. This strategy 
was shown to be completely different to Bush’s approach that simply passed the blame of 
civilian casualties onto the enemy. Taken together, the pictured formed by political rhetoric 
in relation to these three parallel conditions conceals the nature of the political relations in 
Obama’s war on terror. It is the task of the following chapter to question this impression 
and uncover what it conceals, through an analysis of the material and technological 
conditions of drone strikes.  
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- 2 - 
Behind the Rhetoric: the Conditions of Drone Strikes 
 
 
The previous chapter showed that the Obama administration’s rhetorical focus on the 
legality of state force, the precision of the drone, and care taken to avoid civilian casualties 
in the war on terror, reveals the point of maximal difference in comparison to Bush’s war. 
This chapter’s analysis of the material conditions of drone strikes shows that Obama’s 
rhetoric misrepresents the nature of political relations in his war. The third chapter then 
directly maps this analysis onto the Schmittian problem of the political, the friend-enemy 
distinction, and the age of technology. 
 
This chapter reveals an alternative impression of drone strikes to that created by Obama’s 
rhetoric. This is achieved through five sections evaluating different components of the US 
military’s drone strike practices. Whereas the first chapter identified the legality of the use 
of force and precision of the medium as attributes that support the US government’s 
legitimising strategy, in the first section I argue that each individual decision regarding the 
‘legality’ of an operation and ‘precision’ have the effect of insulating human operators from 
the consequences of targeted killings, and accordingly facilitating the use of force. These 
attributes suggest that we are seeing a war shaped by the admixture of technological and 
political thinking; a possibility that is considered directly in the final chapter. The second 
section shows that the drone strike is a technical process in which ‘efficiency’ is the most 
important ‘value’ and the US military are simply tasked with ensuring the successful 
execution of a strike. The third section then unhinges Obama’s assertion that care is taken 
to avoid civilian casualties, and in doing so reveals a paradox of the drone’s material 
conditions. That is: whilst the US military operators can see individuals on the ground 
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clearly thanks to the optical qualities of the drone, because of the mediation of such 
technology combined with the environment in which this occurs – directed by a suspicion 
of individuals observed – this is an inherently detached form of intimacy. The fourth section 
then evaluates the position of dominance granted to the user of force over the target, 
which shapes the relation between user and receiver of force. This condition also indicates 
that the war on terror takes the form of a police operation, which contradicts the Obama 
administration’s assertion that the US executes drone strikes within an armed conflict. 
Finally, the fifth section argues that the combined conditions of technological thinking, 
dominance and detached intimacy inherent to drone strikes dehumanises the target; 
confuting the Obama administration’s representation of drone strikes as a humane use of 
force. This second chapter concludes having challenged the veracity of Obama’s account 
of his war on terror and provided an alternative impression of its practices. My analysis 
below is therefore vital in order to understand the transformed concept of the political in 
Obama’s war on terror. 
 
i. ‘Legal’ and ‘Precise’: Insulating the User of Force 
 
It all began with the leitmotif of precision, of surgical, mathematical and punctual efficacy, which 
is another way of not recognising the enemy as such […] The isolation of the enemy by all kinds 
of electronic interference creates a sort of barricade behind which he becomes invisible.1 
This section scrutinises the US government’s framing of drone strikes as ‘legal’ and 
‘precise’. In contrast to the first chapter that addressed the legality of the drone strike 
regime in general, here, the issue raised is how each individual authorisation proceeds. 
First, the legality of each individual strike is shown to be inherently directed by military 
objectives. The drone strike’s technical and material conditions are then shown to shape 
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political relations behind the embellishment of legality. The ‘legal’ authorisation of a strike, 
and ‘precision’ during its execution insulate drone operators from their own role in the 
execution of a strike. On the one hand, operators are insulated from political, ethical or 
legal decisions, and on the other, operators are insulated from the consequences of poor 
targeting given the supposed precision of the drone. This creates two forms of distance 
between user of force and target, and this makes killing easier for the user of force. 
 
 Legality 
 
The US government requires each drone strike to have legal approval for it to be 
‘actioned’, yet in Obama’s war on terror this approval appears to be heavily directed by 
military objectives.2 As many as four lawyers, known internally as ‘Judge Advocates’ (JAs), 
are present 24/7 in operative locations in order to approve lethal force at any time.3 A JA 
can approve a strike if the requirements of three sets of rules are met: the Law of Armed 
Conflict (LOAC), specific instructions for that operation (known internally as ‘Spins’), and 
Rules of Engagement (ROE).4 The JA’s role is to ensure that each operation does not 
violate these rules. It is the relation between ROE and LOAC that indicates that these rules 
are procedural requirements heavily defined by military objectives. 
 
More precisely, given the JA’s role in drafting both the ROE and LOAC, the JA’s 
determination of a strike's ‘legality’ is arguably influenced by military objectives required to 
draft the ROE. The US Air Operations Centre (AOC) outlines the general principles of 
ROE, including the role of the JA in the drafting stages. ROE has two primary objectives of 
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preventing ‘fratricide’ and ‘balancing competing interests’.5 If for example ‘the ROE are too 
constrained they bind war fighters who can then not get the job done’, therefore they must 
be ‘tactically sound, flexible, understandable, and enforceable’.6 The JA is required to be 
‘familiar with mission and operational concepts, planning, nomenclature, capabilities and 
constraints, and battlefield operating and weapons systems’ in order to draft the ROE, and 
ensure the aforementioned requirements are met.7 The JA is therefore acclimatised within 
the military arena and familiarised with the rationale behind the use of force. The 
subsequent ‘rules’ are claimed to impose limitations upon commanders.8 However, given 
the definition of its intentions and considering what the JA has to take into account in 
drafting said rules, it is more accurately a procedural requirement. Nonetheless, the role of 
the JA in determining the remit of ROE for each operation entails that these ‘rules’ and the 
following strike can subsequently be presented as legally authorised. 
 
The JA are then tasked with ensuring each operation complies with LOAC, and this 
exposes the true meaning of a strike’s ‘legality’. The JA must determine whether each 
target ‘makes an effective contribution to the enemy's military capability and whether its 
capture, destruction, or neutralization will result in a definite military advantage under the 
totality of the circumstances’.9 Given the JA’s necessary awareness of military operations 
to draft the ROE, their consideration of military and strategic information is likely to 
influence their consideration of each operation’s legality. For instance, the US military’s 
understanding of a definite military advantage may direct the ‘necessity’ component of the 
LOAC. The JA familiarise themselves with operational information in relation to an attack 
that is believed to be necessary in military terms, and then make a ‘legal’ decision as to 
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whether the attack will result in a definite military advantage, with the information required 
for each deriving from the US military who have the primary intention of using force. This 
dual role of the JA in deciding upon the ROE and ensuring that legal requirements are 
followed, shows that such legal approval is entangled with the military's strategic 
requirements. Arguably this means that military strategy directs such considerations, and 
are weighted in favour of the attacking side; having affinity with the user of force’s rationale 
for executing a strike. Concurrently, drone strikes can consistently be determined as legal 
since it is ‘possible to make plausible legal argument justifying each and every US drone 
strike’, regardless of the veracity of such claims.10 One may therefore plausibly ask 
whether ‘legality’ offers any meaningful restraints here or whether it is a mere procedural 
requirement? Ultimately, it does appear as though the legality at the heart of Obama’s 
legitimisation of his war on terror is preordained by the nature of this approach to thinking 
about legality.  
 
Legality does not shape or restrict the US military’s use of force in the war on terror when it 
is a mere procedural requirement that satisfies the US executive branch that an 
appropriate ‘legal authority’ has authorised a strike. Because this occurs prior to its 
execution, it can be said that drone operators are effectively absolved of undertaking an 
evaluative role. Operators are still connected to the operation, but the legal authorisation 
means that evaluative thinking regarding their actions – whether it is political thinking 
grounded in a particular ideology or view of the enemy, or legal and ethical judgements 
regarding the use of force – is unnecessary. Notwithstanding the complexity surrounding 
the visual evaluation of a target, as explored in section three below, the user of force can 
simply implement a ‘legal’ strike against a target that is already identified as legitimate. 
The effect of this environment is shown in the comments of a drone pilot who states that 
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‘whatever the case may be, there was a reason that person was targeted’.11 This 
perception insulates the user of force from their own role in bringing about the 
consequences of the use of force. Thus, the lack of deliberation required from military 
personnel effectively makes the use of force easier. Operators only have to make technical 
decisions principally regarding the functioning of the missile; underlining the distance or 
barricade created, behind which the target becomes invisible.12 Ultimately, the relation 
between the user of force and the drone minimises politically evaluative thinking regarding 
the use of force, its effects, and the nature of the target. The human drone operator, it can 
said, is therefore simply an extension of the technology used to execute the will of those 
who decide to approve the use of force.  
 
 Precision 
 
Human operators are also insulated from the consequences of drone strikes at the stage 
of its execution given this predominant role of the drone in supposedly enabling precise 
targeting to occur. Precision – whether a true feature of the weaponry in use or an attribute 
enhanced in military and political communications to form an impression of military 
practices – constructs a particular environment for the user of force. According to Koh, the 
precision of the drone ensures that ‘only legitimate objectives are targeted and that 
collateral damage is kept to a minimum’, and this, if we recall from the previous chapter, 
helps the Obama administration create the impression that a high level of care taken to 
avoid civilians in areas targeted.13 Military personnel also rhetorically emphasise the 
technical precision of the drone toward such ends. US Air Force general counsel Charles 
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Blanchard’s comments exemplify this rhetorical approach as he asserts that ‘these new 
technologies’ ensure ‘the use of military force is only directed against legitimate military 
targets and in a manner designed to minimise collateral damage’.14 Framing the medium 
of violence as objectively achieving the desired outcome and precluding unintended 
consequences has effect of alleviating the human operator of the responsibilities that 
come with targeting. Moreover, this perception arguably makes the use of force easier 
since the drone technology itself appears to take responsibility for the strike. This is 
demonstrated in Blanchard’s assertion that ‘technology has actually raised the bar’ 
meaning that ‘we rarely have civilian casualties’.15 Operators need not be concerned with 
the nature of the target when the ‘hallmark’ of Obama’s ‘counterterrorism efforts’ has 
supposedly been its ‘ability to be exceptionally precise, exceptionally surgical and 
exceptionally targeted’.16 Ultimately, this focus on technology in military discourses 
obscures the role of the human operator in each drone strike. 
 
The US government’s drone strike program therefore typifies the way ‘moral argument and 
force support each other harmoniously so that the old distinction between just ends and 
just means of violence […] is no longer relevant’.17 Technical and military values replace 
deliberation over the nature of the target, and the question of whether to use force at all. 
Although we know that there are longer-term effects from drone strikes such as Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder18, at the point of a strike, the ‘marvels of military technology’ 
engender an environment in which the human operator becomes insulated from the effects 
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of killing innocent civilians.19 This is because, at the moment force is executed, there is a 
suspended ‘connection between the doer and the deed’.20 The doer merely implements 
this legal use of force against a legitimate target with a precise weapon. This echoes Jean 
Baudrillard’s comments on the Gulf War that serve as the epigraph to this section. Killing a 
human is no longer recognised as such when it is carried out cleanly by precise weaponry; 
showing how technical proficiency mediates the relation between user of force and 
receiver and makes the use of force markedly easier. 
 
Drone operators are insulated from the execution of a lethal strike at two key stages in an 
operation: behind the legality of the operation prior to a strike which is heavily shaped by 
US military strategic requirements anyway, and by the precision of the drone at the point of 
a strike. Operators are therefore somewhat displaced both at the point of deciding on the 
target, and striking the intended target. This has the effect of negating deliberation over 
the target and creating a distance between military operators and target which facilitates 
the act of killing. These attributes of US done strike operations also contribute towards the 
making of a highly technical ‘political’ undertaking. 
 
ii. A Technical Process 
 
‘The beaming procedure is complex, and because the panel operates on joint control only, we 
must rehearse the sets of established measures with the utmost care’.21 
 
This section argues that the primary concern for the US military in each drone operation is 
ensuring the strike is successfully and efficiently executed; signalling the admixture of 
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political thinking – which, for Schmitt, is grounded in the distinction between friend and 
enemy – with a technical mode of thinking. This section shows that technical thinking plays 
a pervasive role throughout the execution of US military drone strikes. A thorough 
investigation of what is meant by technology or technical is beyond the scope of the thesis, 
and in this chapter I abide by Schmitt’s understanding of the term. ‘Technical’ is therefore 
understood as practices that are centred on the process and the application of technology, 
taking from Schmitt’s concept of ‘technological thinking’ as the belief that ‘the absolute and 
ultimate neutral ground has been found in technology’.22 This approach is applied in my 
analysis of the stages involved in the drone strike’s kill-chain below, which shows that the 
drone strike is a technical use of force in which the key concern for operators is ensuring a 
killing is successfully and efficiently executed. This is followed by an examination of ways 
in which the ‘value’ of efficiency shapes US government drone strike practices. This 
underlines that, in Obama’s war on terror, the procedures and principles guiding military 
practices in relation to the drone are highly ‘technical’. 
 
 The Killing Process 
 
The kill-chain is the formal structure that the drone strike process takes in each operation, 
which shows the technical form of operations in Obama’s war on terror. A US military 
handbook outlines the kill-chain as a process of ‘Find - Fix - Finish - Exploit - Analyse - 
Disseminate’ as sequential stages for military personnel to follow.23 According to Michael 
Flynn, ‘exploit’ and ‘analyse’ were added to the ‘3F’ model to introduce a new structure 
that begins ‘the cycle over again by providing leads, or start points’ for a new operation.24 
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General Stanley McChrystal believes that the simplicity of the ‘five words in a line’ 
(excluding ‘disseminate’) belies ‘how profoundly it would drive our mission’.25 Indeed, this 
model plays a significant role in directing the targeted killing process, such that each drone 
strike adopts its replicable structure, offering benefits of increased efficiency. Further, the 
inclusion of ‘exploit’ and ‘analyse’ following a strike reiterates the drive to make the drone 
strike program more efficient as a whole, as each killing can act as the start of the next 
operation. As we see below, the US military can be said to systematise this mode of killing, 
and give focus to the technical process rather than the effects of the use of force. 
 
The first stage of the killing process involves data collection on potential targets, or what is 
understood as ‘developing a target’ in a Pentagon presentation.26 The Distributed 
Common Ground System, based at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, is principally 
responsible for this first stage.27 But because new technologies are capable of finding a 
target based on pre-determined features of individuals, these individuals can be a 
determined as a ‘suspect’ or ‘target’ for the operational team.28 For instance, drones can 
operate with a ‘bloodhound mode’ which is capable of identifying particular traits or 
features when flying over locations meaning that the drone can identify an individual prior 
to a human’s observation of the same location.29 For the US military, tracking time prior to 
a strike, and thus the overall time of a strike, can be minimised. This drive towards 
streamlining and improving the process of finding a target does nothing to improve the 
user of force’s ability to avoid civilian casualties. For instance, each of the reported seven 
strikes needed to kill US target Baitullah Mehsud may have been ‘efficient’, but in the 
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process they killed 164 civilians.30 Consequently, it can be said that Obama’s war on terror 
is evidently shaped by the reach of technology and driven by a technological form of 
thinking, rather than the ethical concern for civilians that in the previous chapter we saw 
emphasised by Obama. 
 
After an individual is established as a target – whether through inclusion on the US 
government’s ‘kill list’, or following identification in an operation – the process leading to a 
strike against that individual follows an established chain of communication.31 Military or 
CIA analysts compile a file on the threat of a particular target which is reported to contain 
the following sentence on each occasion: based ‘on the above [evidence], we believe (Mr. 
X) poses a current and ongoing threat to the United States and therefore meets the legal 
criteria for lethal action pursuant to the Presidential Finding’.32 In the case of personnel 
strikes, meaning those taken against known individuals, members of the executive branch 
known as ‘the Principals Committee’, then examine the file.33 Once the administration 
authorises a strike, and the JA adjudge the operation to adhere to the LOAC and ROE, 
‘Mr. X’ then becomes a legitimate target, and the drone crew can execute the strike. There 
is a efficient quality to the drone strike given this attention on the replicable process to 
which the target on each occasion is merely an interchangeable end product. 
The ensuing ‘actioning’34 stage of a lethal strike is then an inherently technical process in 
itself, as shown in the recollections of a former drone pilot:  
 
                                                 
30 Spencer Ackerman, ’41 Men Targeted but 1,147 People Killed’ The Guardian (November 24 2014) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/nov/24/-sp-us-drone-strikes-kill-1147> accessed December 13 
2015. 
31 Dana Priest, William Arkin, ‘Inside the CIA’s 'Kill List'’, Frontline (September 6, 2011), < 
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32 ibid 
33 Currier (n 26). 
34 Currier (n 26), see ‘Pentagon Presentation’ slide. 
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I’ll set the laser on a spot, you’ll see a box pop up, and what it does is lock in those pixels as we 
are circling, then the computer will figure out the trajectory, the distance and the speed and 
come up with an estimated time that it will take for the missile to impact. The pilot will get all the 
clearances that are necessary to fire, he’ll release the missile and i’ll guide it on to its target.35  
 
The pilot is focused on ensuring the correct use of technology and need not deliberate 
over the nature of the target, which has already been established as a threat that must be 
removed. A drone pilot’s comments defending drone strikes as being no less intimate than 
manned planes in fact supports my suggestion that drones are mainly a technical use of 
force. In his words, ‘you still have worry about the traditional things that concern pilots, like 
altitude de-confliction and airspace de-confliction. In addition, you need the ability to 
manage and disseminate information and deal with different scenarios with other 
individuals and other aircraft’.36 This description almost mirrors Don DeLillo’s ironic take on 
the ‘human’ moments in the next world war, which serves as the epigraph to this section. 
Instead of demonstrating the intimate nature of drone strikes as the pilot intended, this 
description in fact supports the argument that drone strikes create a technical form of 
killing in which attention is given above all to the successful application of technology. The 
execution of a human ‘threat’ thus has deep parallels with the execution of a ‘cyber’ threat 
in Lockheed Martin’s kill chain as there is little focus upon the human element of the target 
in the ‘disseminate’ stage.37 This exemplifies the nature of war when technical proficiency 
partly displaces ‘human’ considerations regarding the target and the broader 
consequences of each strike. Indeed, as Derek Gregory remarks, the UAV kill-chain 
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results in the killing of an individual becoming an ‘abstract, purely technical exercise’.38 
Human operators are principally required to think about the technical aspects of the 
process at each point in the kill-chain, and this engenders a form of killing that appears to 
be completely devoid of evaluative thinking regarding such action or its effects. 
 
 Efficiency 
The drive to compress the time necessary to complete the kill-chain gives a more 
complete picture of the technical nature of the drone strike process, and the primacy of a 
‘technological’ form of thinking in Obama’s war on terror. As Greg Miller explains, ‘the 
Obama administration has spent much of the past year codifying and streamlining the 
processes’ of operations.39 Efficiency thus appears to be a key value in Obama’s war on 
terror; directing all drone strike operations. As the US Air Force Centre for Strategy and 
Technology outlines, the kill-chain can now take less than 45 minutes, with this to be 
reduced to ‘seconds by the year 2025’.40 This gives a clear indication of the turn towards 
making military practices more efficient in the ongoing war on terror. 
 
The location of the JA’s within the air force bases from which drone strikes are directed 
and executed helps improve the time efficiency of each strike, and underlines the 
importance of the time taken as the key measure of a successful strike.41 The lawyer’s 
inclusion within the operational team helps negate the effects of legal deliberation on the 
time of an operation and also increases the potential to execute a strike when operations 
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are time sensitive due to the movement of the target.42 Occurring in the event, both in 
terms of the airforce base and the timeframe of a mission, such legal considerations 
minimises possible delay that could result from having to wait for external judicial 
authorisation before a strike can be executed.  
 
This general push to streamline the process of a drone strike entails that parallels can be 
drawn with the efficiency, ‘standardization and mass production’ central to Fordist style 
production lines.43 This similarity is shown in reports from drone pilots that a strike takes 
‘up to 17 steps—including entering data into a pull-down window—to fire a missile’.44 
When such importance is given to the steps taken to execute a strike, the effects of such 
action are arguably neglected. Indeed, as a drone pilot remarked while in the process of 
targeting innocent civilians in a drone strike that will be analysed in detail below: 
‘remember: killchain!’45 Ultimately, the use of force in Obama’s war on terror is highly 
technical as such procedural steps, and the broader goal of efficiency, direct its targeted 
killing operations. 
 
The technical nature of the kill-chain, together with the Obama administration’s focus on 
improving the time efficiency of each strike, and the US military’s fetishisation of 
procedural steps, shows that ‘technological thinking’ plays a key role in Obama’s war on 
terror. There is a clear focus on the replication of pre-determined ‘steps’ and the point of 
execution is an abstract, technical exercise.  
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iii. Intimate Yet Detached 
 
We now turn to address the relation between user of force and target that belongs to this 
technical process. I approach this topic, and apply the preceding sections, through a 
consideration of the visual elements of the targeting process; using a transcript detailing 
the process of a drone strike from the point of view of the user of force to do so.46 This first 
helps uncover that the mediation of the drone allows operators to experience an ‘intimacy’ 
with individuals on the ground. Lilie Chouliaraki’s notion that ‘mediation connects us by 
delivering intimacy’ is therefore true for drone operators.47 However, the user of force is 
simultaneously detached from those being observed since such intimacy is used to 
enhance their ability to kill from their spatially distant operational position. This creates a 
detached intimacy; a form of ‘intimacy at a distance’.48 As I then argue, such intimacy is 
located within an environment of suspicion; obscuring operators from finding anything 
other than a ‘legitimate’ target. Thus, the medium of the drone simply enhances the US 
military’s ability to ‘find’ and strike against perceived threats, and contrary to Obama’s 
rhetoric the drone does not thereby improve the user of force’s ability to avoid civilian 
casualties. 
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 Detached Intimacy 
 
Thanks to the capabilities of drone technology, the movements of targets as far away from 
drone operators as 7,000 miles can be tracked at length and in considerable detail.49 For 
the user of force – whose eyes are a matter of inches from the screen, on which objects 
thus no longer appear thousands of miles distant – an impression of 'optical proximity’ 
mitigates the true physical distance between drone operators and targets.50 This visual 
position of the user of force, combined with the scenario in which the US military follow 
suspects for several hours, has led commentators to assert that drone strikes create an 
intimate experience for the user of force.51 Derek Gregory has said that the drone strike 
operator is highly immersed in their operations and this creates a virtual relationship which 
is 'palpable and pervasive’, unlike other forms of force,52 whilst Mark Bowden effectively 
summarises this belief, stating that ‘war by remote control turns out to be intimate’.53 
However, a transcript documenting the user of force’s experience of a drone strike and the 
target, to which I will turn shortly, shows that it is more accurate to say that the material 
conditions of the drone create a form of detached intimacy. 
 
The transcript covers the operations of a Predator drone crew responsible for protecting a 
US Special Operations ‘A-Team’ in Khod in the Uruzgan District of Afghanistan. The drone 
crew, physically situated in Creech Air Force Base in Nevada, were using the Predator to 
follow a convoy of three vehicles that was nearing the A-Team. The drone crew’s main 
objective became identification of the convoy as a target when the A-Team, hearing of two 
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vehicles in the nearby area, requested that they ‘destroy the vehicles and personnel’.54 To 
do so, the Predator crew needed to visually confirm that the target posed an imminent 
threat. The drone crew immediately attempted to do so as the pilot asks the camera 
operator if he can see a rifle. The operator responds that he ‘can't really tell right now, but 
it does look like an object’.55 The Predator crew then informs the ground crew that more 
information is required in order to make a ‘positive identification’.56  
 
From the outset of the account, it is evident that the operators utilise the ‘voyeuristic 
intimacy’ produced through the drone so as to improve the possibility of using force 
against the individuals below.57 Indeed, the pilot’s observations that individuals are praying 
is even met by remarks that ‘this is their [Taliban] force’ and praying ‘is what they do’.58 
Here we can see how the drone effectively closes the distance between ‘spectator and 
spectacle’.59 
 
The operator is then able to relay the information gathered to other members of the crew, 
and in response, the pilot states that he hopes ‘we get to shoot the truck with all the dudes 
in it’, and the camera operator also calling it a ‘sweet target’.60 Individuals on the ground 
arguably become mere ‘operative images’, no longer people when they are ‘part of an 
operation’.61 Optical proximity – closeness to full-motion video feeds – is simply a means 
through which to enhance the possibility of using lethal force. The intimacy is 
fundamentally detached because its purpose is to improve the possibility of killing those 
individuals in a manner that inherently lacks intimacy given the spatial divide and technical 
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form of killing that ensues. The Predator crew’s summary of observations underline this 
detached form of intimacy when it is said that ‘our screeners are currently calling 21 MAMs 
[military age males], no females, and two possible children’,62 with ‘children’ being clarified 
as ‘not toddlers. Something more towards adolescents or teens’.63 As a result, the drone 
crew concludes that they have made a positive identification due to ‘the weapons we’ve 
identified and the demographics of the individuals’.64 Moreover, the pilot amended the 
initial identification, now stating that ‘our screener updated only one adolescent, so that's 
one double-digit age range’.65 The A-Team operator responds that ‘12 or 13 years old with 
a weapon is just as dangerous’.66 Unsurprisingly, this operational and visual intimacy that 
the drone operators experience is again utilised to enable the crew to execute a strike. On 
the basis of the drone crew’s presented ‘observations’, the strike was indeed subsequently 
executed, with Hellfire missiles directly hitting the first and third vehicles, killing 23 
civilians.67 
 
Following the strike, the crew’s observations change significantly. The intelligence 
coordinator identifies women and children, and the pilot states that a ‘lady is carrying a 
kid’, which the intelligence coordinator confirms; there is ‘a baby, I think, on the right. 
Yeah’.68 The camera operator now also recognises that individuals are younger than 
adolescents. The pilot radios back to the A Team that since the engagement ‘we have not 
been able to PID [positively identify] any weapons’.69 The camera operator reassures the 
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other crew members that whilst they had struck the wrong target, there was ‘no way to tell 
from here’.70  
 
This account shows that the imaging technology of the drone may be seen to give an 
illusory or false impression of certainty, which is why the operators were wrong in their 
initial identifications. It is possible that this can be rectified through technological 
improvements, such as clearer images, sharper definition, and improved colour rendering. 
However, the vision technology used seems to render clear and precise enough images to 
avoid such fatal errors of decision making. This fact is evident even in this transcript, since 
operators are able to identify characteristics such as the brands of vehicles in the convoy, 
and they recognise that some of the targets are wearing jewellery, both prior to and 
following the strike.71 Thus, instead of the image not being sufficiently clear for operators 
to make decisions regarding the identities of individuals below, it appears that drone 
operators are affectively conditioned by their task and its technology into identifying false 
positive targets. Therefore it can be cogently claimed that more efficient technology cannot 
rectify this situation and may make targeting produces more erroneous and the targets 
more likely to be civilians. 
 
 An Environment of Suspicion 
 
US military personnel operate drones in what can be termed as an environment of 
suspicion, which conditions the approach taken to the use of force. It is first significant that 
the user of force accepts their role of purposively searching for a target, or executing a 
strike against a predetermined target. In her consideration of the nature of personal 
responsibility, Hannah Arendt hopes that there is a ‘human faculty’ which ‘is not bound by 
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standards and rules under which particular cases are simply subsumed, but on the 
contrary, produces its own principles by virtue of judging activity itself’.72 This would at 
least require a thought independent from that determined by the question of the ‘legality’ of 
the use of force, which seems, in the case just described, to be absent from the process of 
target confirmation. But besides this failure of the individual human faculty to question 
standards and rules of the use of force, the environment in which drone strikes operate 
arguably conditions the decision making of human operators. As Arendt asks: how can an 
individual ‘tell right from wrong’ if that person’s ‘whole environment has prejudged the 
issue?’73 
 
A ‘techno-cultural hermeneutics of suspicion’ defines this environment in which drone 
strikes are located; making technology a mere facilitator of lethal force.74 The operators’ 
task is directed to a strong degree by suspicion of individuals on the ground, as every 
unknown is a possible threat. A US Pentagon department study gives an indication of this 
approach in US military practices generally, especially given that enemy ‘leaders look like 
everyone else; enemy combatants look like everyone else; enemy vehicles look like 
civilian vehicles; enemy installations look like civilian installations’.75 The drone crew’s 
operation outlined above reflects this approach in practice. The crew’s observations of the 
convoy, particularly when praying, express the suspicion-led practices of Obama’s war on 
terror. These considerations seem to confirm that regardless of improvements made to 
imaging technology, the user of force’s role is to kill individuals perceived as suspects on 
the basis of ambiguous visual signifiers, irrespective of whether there is any 
incontrovertible evidence that they are a threat. Optical proximity is clearly an asset that is 
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utilised to improve the possibilities of identifying and killing a target. It is highly likely that 
any improved imaging technology will facilitate more targeted killings, rather than having a 
positive effect of, for instance, reducing the number of civilians killed.  
 
Contrary to Obama’s call that the drone helps avoid civilian casualties, this section has 
illustrated that the drone merely enhances the US military’s ability to undertake a strike, 
regardless of the presence of civilians on the ground.76 The mediation of the drone creates 
a detached intimacy between drone operators and individuals observed in areas targeted. 
The physical distance between the two parties is mitigated by the drone, yet this only helps 
operators achieve their goal of finding and targeting suspects within an environment of 
suspicion. As this chapter now moves to show, this characteristic of the drone has 
significant implications for the asymmetrical relation between user of force and target. 
 
iv. Dominant and Safe 
 
Drones are a combination of the new and the old: a new aerial surveillance and killing system 
with capabilities previously not offered by conventional air power, coupled with an older cosmic 
view of air mastery through technological speed, verticality, and vision.77 
 
According to Costas Douzinas, the conflicts of Kosovo and Afghanistan were not ‘wars but 
a type of hunting’ in which ‘one side was totally protected while the other had no chance of 
effectively defending itself or counter-attacking’.78 This indicates an asymmetrical 
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‘dominance’ that also arguably characterised Bush’s war on terror.79 Obama’s war on 
terror fails to break from this lineage of military dominance from above, as the conditions of 
the drone ensure the user of force holds such a position over its target. This dominance – 
resulting from the capacity to kill and safety of the user of force – grants operators the 
godlike power spoken of by Douzinas,80 and also suggests that the US government’s use 
of drone strikes typifies the paradigm of war as a police operation.81 
 
In War and Cinema, Paul Virilio says that, ‘from the original watch-tower through the 
anchored balloon to the reconnaissance aircraft and remote-sensing satellites, one and 
the same function has been indefinitely repeated, the eye’s function being the function of a 
weapon’.82 The drone follows this history of technological progression that utilises visuality 
as a tool. Drone operators are in a position of complete power over the life of another: 
capable of viewing and executing the target from a ‘vertical’ video perspective at a safe 
distance. This capacity is believed to give a sense of god-like power.83 As one drone 
operator has put simply; ‘sometimes I feel like a God hurling thunderbolts from afar’.84  
 
Paul Virilio has said that a ‘constant search for ideal weightlessness is at the heart of 
problems of domination’.85 The drone strike’s dual qualities of aerial dominance and 
position of safety for the attacking side seems to resolves this search. The drone enables 
the body of the user of force to be removed from the physical space above the target 
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without losing the killing capabilities of manned planes. This position draws parallels with 
Plato’s Ring of Gyges, in which a shepherd Gyges finds a gold ring that makes him 
invisible.86 Gyges cannot be defeated with this power, so he kills the king and takes the 
throne. Whilst Plato used this story as a thought experiment to reflect on the effect of 
having power over other humans, we can now see this position of power in reality, 
evidenced in the produced ‘invisibility’ granted to the user of drones. 
 
Such a capacity does not however mean that the use of force is more considered and less 
erratic than manned aircraft due to the operator’s ability to observe for as long as 
necessary without risk. On the contrary, evidence shows that the US executes a significant 
number of strikes in order to successfully strike one known individual; killing high numbers 
of civilians in the process and confuting the Obama administration’s assertion that drones 
are precise or indeed humane.87 Moreover, as the users of force are not at risk, the drone 
can maintain its position over the target following a strike. With this ability, the US military 
target people coming to help the wounded in what is known as a double tap.88 It is 
arguably because the user of force is afforded this dominant position of control over life 
and death within an environment of suspicion that this power to use such force is 
habitually exploited.89 This trait of utilising this dominant position and techniques such as 
the double-tap exemplify the godlike experience of drone operators. 
 
The nature of this position of dominance impacts upon the civilians below. As Amedeo 
Policante recognises, ‘those about whom life-or-death decisions are made, as they scurry 
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below, have – like any being faced with the gods – no recourse or appeal’.90 The target is 
– without capacity to choose otherwise – in a position of submission, contrasting with the 
dominant position of the US military. These conditions result in a form of ‘exterminatory 
violence’, whereby ‘the targeted human subject is reduced to an anonymous simulacrum 
that flickers across the screen and that can effectively be liquidated into a ‘pattern of 
death’ with the swivel of a joystick’.91 With this description, Joseph Pugliese effectively 
captures the juxtaposition of the unprotected individual, with the technologically dominant 
and safe military operator.  
 
The geographical distance between user of force and attacked location in particular is 
what ‘insulate[s] pilots and allies from direct harm while subjecting targets to ‘precision’ 
scrutiny and/or attack’.92 Thus, the drone affects a ‘clean war’; a term Baudrillard used as 
a commentary on the shift away from a type of war that seeks principally to kill the enemy, 
towards a process of controlling the enemy with efficient technologies that make war as 
bloodless as possible.93 The foreclosing of a violent retaliation against US military 
operators entails that this clean bloodless position is granted to drone operators. Further, 
the drone allows this clean position in war to spread beyond the drone’s operational team 
by reducing the number of US ground troops in operative locations, or removing them 
altogether. This echoes what James Der Derian has referred to as ‘virtuous war', founded 
on 'the technical ability and ethical imperative to threaten and, if necessary, actualise 
violence from a distance – with no or minimal casualties’.94 Here, the use of the term 
‘virtuous’ to describe a war that is clean for one side seems contradictory, inverting the 
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traditional notion of virtue being associated with bravery and sacrifice.95 Instead, the 
virtuousness of war attaches to the minimisation of casualties; equated with clean or 
bloodlessness.  
 
So the drone strike offers a form of ‘war’, which is more precisely a ‘safe’ mode of killing; 
clearly departing from the classic Clausewitzean notion of warfare being an heroic duel.96 
Indeed, drawing parallels between drone use and lethal poison – which was historically 
outlawed from war – Chamayou asserts that drone strikes are a unilateral form of killing; 
removing the supposedly mutual right or capacity to kill from war.97 This lack of parallel 
between drone killings and previous forms of war is arguably because this dominance is 
demonstrative of a more recent transformation of war into a ‘police operation’, as 
recognised by Agamben.98 Moreover, Mark Neocleous believes that if the term ‘police’ is 
understood in line with Foucault’s use of the term as the ‘general process of 
administration, security and order’, then ‘war and police are always already together’.99 
This conflation – whether ever-present or a modern phenomenon – is a prominent feature 
of the US government’s current use of drone strikes. This brings into question the binary 
distinction between law enforcement and armed conflicts, as well as Obama’s framing of 
the use of force as the latter, as examined in the first chapter.100 It can said that Obama’s 
hunt to kill strategy is costumed as ‘war’ so as to avoid the restrictions imposed on lethal 
law enforcement operations in international law which are based upon the presumption 
that the ‘prosecutor’ has ‘much greater resources at his or her disposal’.101 Significantly, 
the US government is able to exploit and sustain this form of military dominance by 
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transferring such inequality of resources into a ‘war’ domain. This means that 'politically 
and juridically', the person subjected to the use of force via the drone is 'no longer 
positioned, in any sense of the term, on the same ground as oneself’.102 
 
This section has explored how the user of force is afforded a position of dominance via the 
drone, which shapes the asymmetrical relation between user of force and target. Although 
‘dominance’ of the attacking side is not an original phenomenon – arguably a key 
characteristic of the US government’s practices in the ‘war on terror’ under Bush – the 
conditions of drone strikes in many ways strengthen this position.103 This dominant 
attribute for the attacking party in war is the apotheosis of ‘air power as police power’.104 
Therefore, this impression of the operational conditions of the drone strike is incongruent 
with Obama’s representation in the previous chapter. A more accurate reading following 
this analysis is that Obama’s drone program is a continuation of unilateral military-police 
practices through a new medium; with a technologically superior state force exploiting its 
position of dominance to kill anyone regarded as a threat from a safe location. Thus, it can 
be said that the most noticeable difference between the counterterrorism policy of Bush 
and Obama is ‘the shift in tone and the promises of engagement’.105 We will revisit this 
shift in tone again in the next chapter, but for now we turn to look at how the conditions of 
the drone strike addressed so far dehumanise the target. 
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v. Dehumanising the Target 
 
‘With their virtues they want to scratch out the eyes of their enemies; and they elevate 
themselves only that they may lower others’.106 
 
This final section of this chapter shows that the conditions of drone strike operations 
dehumanise their target. The particular process of a drone strike creates an environment 
that facilitates dehumanisation. In particular, the viewing conditions of the use of force 
shape the military operator’s dehumanising characterisation of the enemy. This section 
therefore further destabilises the Obama administration’s representation of drones 
examined in the previous chapter as the dehumanising effects of the drone strike 
contradicts the impression of a humane counterterrorism program. 
 
Aditya Sakorka believes that dehumanisation of the so-called ‘terrorist’ has the effect of 
facilitating ‘the execution of broad counterterrorism measures in multiple contexts’.107 
Indeed, as Jayne Mooney and Jock Young explain, the way the ‘other’ is contrasted with 
the Western subject through various social and economic factors in post-9/11 anti-terror 
discourse facilitates violence to the extent that ‘dehumanisation allows the actor to render 
the other as outside, or on the periphery of humanity’.108 Thus, the very framing of the ‘war 
on terror’ may dehumanise others, as seen in Bush’s post 9/11 rhetoric, particularly his call 
for a crusade against the evil perpetrators of the attacks,109 and more generally via news 
media accounts of the war on terror that use ‘metaphors that linguistically frame the enemy 
                                                 
106 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Dover Publications 2000) 62. 
107 Aditya Sakorka, ‘Dehumanisation and Terrorism’ Open Democracy (November 28 2012) 
<https://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/aditya-sakorkar/dehumanisation-and-terrorism> accessed 
January 12 2015. 
108 Jayne Mooney, Jock Young, ‘Imagining Terrorism: Terrorism and Anti-Terrorism Terrorism, Two Ways of 
Doing Evil’ (2005) vol 32:1 Social Justice, 119. 
109 George Bush, ‘Remarks by the President Upon Arrival’ The White House (September 16 2001). 
  77 
in particular ways’.110 Dehumanisation may therefore take various forms, but each 
minimises the worth of the other: demonising and stripping them of human value which, in 
Bush’s war on terror, arguably facilitated violence against such individuals. This 
understanding of dehumanisation is here applied to the above reading of drone strikes, 
showing that Obama’s enemy is dehumanised at the level of military practices as the 
technology in use conditions the economy of violence. 
 
The procedure of a drone strike, requirements of drone operators therein, and 
environment in which this occurs shapes the relation between user of force and target, and 
creates a foundation for dehumanisation. Although the drone strike described above 
shows military operators recognising human actions such as praying, and characteristics 
such as their age in their search for a target, it can be said that the user of force 
experiences that force’s recipient as a target simply possessed of these traits. The 
difference is significant. Despite displaying ‘human’ characteristics quite vividly, individuals 
below become mere targets for the purpose of the operation. Due to the technical nature 
of this operation, once the operators receive confirmation that a strike can go ahead, 
‘enemy threats—real or imaginary, human or machine—become precise grid locations’.111 
A drone operator’s account of his role supports this argument, as he remarks: ’you get to a 
point in the target’s life cycle that you are following them, you don’t even refer to them by 
their actual name’, and according to him, this practice ‘contributes’ towards ‘dehumanizing 
the people before you’ve even encountered the moral question of “is this a legitimate kill or 
not?”112 Regardless of the ‘human’ actions that lead operators to attribute individuals with 
their ‘target’ status, this is abstracted from them once they are recognised in this context 
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as the next recipient of a strike. The enemy’s transformation into a grid location shows how 
individuals are ‘abstracted from their human context’ via the drone strike and 
predominantly technical operational procedures.113 Thus, the nature of drone strike 
practices facilitates the dehumanisation of the target because it fragments the connection 
between ‘doer’ and ‘deed’,114 so that human operators ‘remain differentiated and 
proximate, at least culturally if not physically’.115 
 
Indeed there is also such physical distance accompanying the non-physical form of barrier, 
meaning that no individual operator in the process is made to come in contact with the 
target. Kristin Sandvik and Kjersti Lohne recognise that physical distance also ‘plays a role 
in the processes of dehumanisation’.116 Arguably, the military’s framing of the target such a 
distance can lead to dehumanisation. Now that the carrier of weaponry flies at an altitude 
of 20,000 feet,117 and given that the pilot is now physically separate from that carrier, the 
pilot’s physical remove has ‘never been greater than [it is] in contemporary drone 
warfare’.118 The process of killing from afar in drone strikes entails that drone operators 
can only see their victim from a certain perspective. As Benjamin Noys remarks, this is 
why there is ‘no ‘face’ for the victims’ as victims ‘do not come into face-to-face contact with 
their killer’ and ‘their faces don’t appear’ visually on operator’s screens.119 The ‘process’ of 
a strike reinforces this lack of encounter as each human operator has a set role and 
duties, so, as Gregory recognises, ‘the personal’ is distributed amongst ‘senior officers, 
military lawyers, image analysts and ground commanders’ in a way ‘that for most crews it 
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also becomes more impersonal’.120 This lack of encounter may not necessarily be a new 
phenomenon in aerial warfare but does show how the encounter between the user of force 
and the target is restricted, especially when accompanied by the abstraction of the human 
target into a mere grid location once a strike is authorised. The user of force’s experience 
a drone strike is therefore restricted to seeing through screens at air force bases. 
Significantly, the perspective entails that operators see the target from a vertical 
perspective.121  
 
These viewing conditions shape the type of dehumanising characterisations of drone strike 
victims. Chief among these is the US military’s frequent use of the term ‘bugsplat’.122 It is 
as if drone operators have continued what the media were charged with doing in the war 
on terror via the similar ‘use of dehumanising animal metaphors’ to frame the recipient of 
force.123 The CIA use the term ‘bugsplat’ to describe a successfully launched missile from 
a drone that reaches the intended target.124 The US military also use ‘bugsplat’ as the 
‘official term’ when a drone strike hits a human target, whether civilian or otherwise.125 The 
term derives from the effectual impression of killing from above, where the view of the 
human target following a strike can give the sense of an insect being crushed.126 
 
When military personnel use the term ‘bugsplat’, it degrades its victim, doing so by 
‘inserting them within the field of a cartoonish pop culture where, as disposable figures, 
their deaths are scripted as mere comic mishap’.127 But the term also underlines the nature 
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of the relation the drone engineers between user of force and victim more generally. It 
represents the vivid effects of human prowess over the passive, lesser creature below, 
emphasising their ‘inevitable defeat’.128 The human target is reduced to a bugsplat through 
their ‘relation’ with the technologically superior opposition, the latter of which remain 
unaffected by the transition of the target from living human to an ‘entomological waste’.129 
The CIA and military operators are characteristically human; the target is characteristically 
an insect. Sam Keen identified a possible rationale of this degrading form of 
dehumanisation as; ‘the lower down in the animal phyla the image descends, the greater 
the sanction is given to the solider to become the exterminator of pests’.130 This ease of 
killing following such dehumanisation shapes the relation between user of force and target 
in Obama’s war on terror, and is explored further in the following chapter. 
 
The dehumanising effect of drone strikes offers the clearest picture of difference between 
the Obama administration’s representation and the conditions of the use of force in 
practice. Dehumanisation it is not only unsupportive of the the US government’s 
constructed impression, but too contradicts the very notion that drone strikes are somehow 
an improvement on alternative aerial methods of warfare gone before, or that the medium 
offers a positive change for civilians in areas targeted. Instead, a process driven by 
technological thought in which a position of dominance is afforded to the user of force 
dehumanises and reduces the target to the status of a mere bugsplat; reflecting 
Nietzsche’s comments that serve as the epigraph to this section. 
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Conclusion 
 
Through an examination of the material conditions and practices of US military drone 
strikes, this chapter has uncovered the nature of the disconnect between the Obama 
administration’s representation of drone strikes in the previous chapter and the use of 
force in practice. In doing so, it has also identified in a preliminary way the nature of the 
political relations in Obama’s war on terror. This was achieved through five stages of 
analysis. First, the attributes of ‘legality’ and ‘precision’ of US military drone strike practices 
were shown to have the effect of insulating human operators and facilitating the use of 
force without the need for deliberation over the nature of the target. Second, the US 
military’s focus on ensuring a successful and efficient strike is executed shows that killing 
via the drone is a technical process directed by ‘technological’ thinking. The third stage 
analysed a particular instance of a drone strike to challenge the US government’s 
assertion that care is taken to avoid civilian casualties. The user of force’s visual proximity 
with the target creates an ‘intimacy’, but this is a detached form of intimacy given the 
spatial distance between user of force and target, and suspicion-orientated environment of 
the user of force. Improved sight of individuals below thus merely enhances drone 
operator’s killing capabilities. Fourth, the dominance present in this analysis of the one 
particular strike was seen as characteristic of the visual capabilities and safe positioning of 
the drone crew in juxtaposition with the unprotected position of the target. This dominant 
position indicates a continuation of military practices in Bush’s war on terror and typifies 
the trend of police operations being concealed as wars. The fifth stage showed that the 
conditions considered thus far in the chapter dehumanise the target; epitomised in the 
military use of the term bugsplat to describe the victim of a strike. This chapter’s analysis 
of the conditions of drone strikes ultimately confutes the Obama administration’s 
representation of drone strikes. The nature of political relations formed through drone 
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strikes examined in this chapter can now be mapped directly onto the Schmittian problem 
of the political guiding this thesis. 
  83 
- 3 - 
Schmittian Politics in Obama’s War on Terror 
 
 
The introduction to this thesis established that Bush’s war on terror was centred on the 
division between friend and enemy. The first chapter looked at the role of legality in 
Obama’s legitimising strategy in comparison with Bush’s divisive rhetoric that showed the 
point of maximal difference between Obama and Bush’s wars of terror, and Obama’s 
apparent transition away from a Schmittian form of politics. The second chapter 
interrogated the veracity of this impression, and in doing so problematised the nature of 
political relations in Obama’s war on terror. This revealed key paradoxes resulting from 
drone strikes including the detached intimacy of operators, the central role of technical 
thinking and the ‘unprecedented intertwining’ of ‘politics and technology’ in the execution 
of Obama’s war on terror.1 In this chapter, these elements are mapped onto the Schmittian 
problem of the political in this age of drones. I will consider the relation between user of 
force and target, the effect of technological thinking, and the Obama administration’s 
representation of drone strikes in order to interrogate the concept of the political in 
Obama’s war on terror, and its difference from Bush’s. In particular, I suggest that 
technological thinking and the material conditions of drone strikes transfigure the enemy 
into a form different from that of Bush’s war, whilst Obama’s rhetoric constructs an 
ideological ‘friend’ grouping that is also different from Bush’s. Crucially, my analysis shows 
that there has been a transformation of the political in Obama’s war on terror by its 
admixture with technology and technological thinking. Political relations in Obama’s war on 
terror do not exist independently of technology, and technology does not simply intensify 
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political intentions when mastered since political relations are partly produced by 
technology. 
 
Schmitt believed that politics is reducible to the distinction between friend and enemy, 
which has the effect of leading to conflict between states.2 Yet he was cautious that the 
‘neutrality’ of technology and technological thinking posed a threat to the political.3 This 
relation between politics and technology in Schmitt’s thinking and the possibility of 
hyperpoliticisation, is addressed first in this chapter, since it is vital to understanding the 
concept of the political in Obama’s war on terror. This is followed by an analysis of this 
relation in connect with the technological and the Schmittian political. I argue that the 
antithetical relation between politics and technology in this context has the effect of 
transforming the concept of the political; a process adverted to by several post-Schmittian 
scholars. The transformation of the enemy then becomes a central focus of this chapter. 
The enemy in Obama’s war on terror, like Bush’s enemy, is abstract and located within the 
phenomenon of indefinite war along the trajectory envisaged by Hardt and Negri.4 
However, through an analysis of the so-called ‘signature strike’, I show that the specific 
and technologically determined quality of this abstractness is what distinguishes Bush and 
Obama’s enemies. This difference means that dehumanisation of the enemy under Bush 
is engendered by his rhetoric, whereas under Obama dehumanisation is a function of 
techno-military practices. It is then argued that the Obama administration and US military 
seek to annihilate this abstract enemy. Here we are able to see the fine balance between 
new Schmittian political relations and hyperpoliticisiaton. 
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Because the Schmittian political is based upon the distinction between enemy and friend, 
this chapter then considers the concept of the ‘friend’ and the conditions of its formation. 
Based on an interpretation of Schmitt’s work that the formation of political relations 
extends beyond the execution of the decision, I argue that the friend grouping forms in 
relation to the representational dynamic of Bush’s and Obama’s war on terror. We will 
therefore revisit some of my analysis undertaken in the first chapter in order to understand 
the difference between Bush and Obama’s friend groupings. The representational dynamic 
of Obama’s war on terror is different from Bush’s, since it centres on the reasonableness 
of the solution and belong within a discourse of humane warfare. It is then argued that 
Obama is better at constructing a ‘universal’ identity for his friend grouping than Bush and 
offers a more worldly impression of the use of force. This particular form of the friend, 
together with the manifestation of the enemy, shows the transformation of the Schmittian 
political in Obama’s war on terror. 
 
i. Schmitt’s Concept of the Political in the Age of Technology 
 
Schmitt believed that the political emerges on the actualisation of the ‘enemy’ by the 
sovereign,5 meaning that the distinction is, in Mark Neocleous’ terms, ‘concrete and 
existential rather than metaphorical or symbolic’.6 Given that the Schmittian political is 
grounded upon this division, the utopian scenario of a ‘completely pacified globe’ would for 
Schmitt be ‘a world without the distinction of friend and enemy and hence a world without 
politics’.7 In the Concept of the Political (1927), Schmitt does not contemplate this 
possibility further, reinforcing that the ‘phenomenon of the political’ can only be understood 
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in the context ‘of the friend-and-enemy grouping’ regardless of implications for ‘morality, 
aesthetics, and economics’.8 
 
However, in the Age of Neutralisations and Depoliticisations (1929), Schmitt sees Europe 
to be ‘wandering’ from a ‘conflictual domain’ to a ‘neutral’ one in which the ‘absolute and 
ultimate neutral ground has been found in technology’, as it supposedly ‘serves everyone’ 
whilst providing ‘no criterion for evaluating’ its usages or effects.9 Schmitt appears to be 
cautious of the resulting neutralising effect of technology, that can mean ‘a silk blouse and 
poison gas’ become indistinguishable.10 It follows that ‘everything is neutralised’, and the 
‘confusion becomes unspeakable’ when ‘the very nature of what real is, is called into 
question in the age of technology’.11 Thus, there is a ‘powerful qualitative difference’ with 
the age of technology in comparison to previous epochs since its neutrality offers the ‘very 
principle of depoliticisation’.12 In particular, as John McCormick’s reading of Neutralisations 
suggests; Schmitt believed the ‘truly compelling problem posed by the primacy of the 
technical in the modern world is not the machines that characterise technology so much as 
the way of thinking and the spirit that creates and continues to drive those machines’.13 
Effectively, Schmitt distinguishes between ‘the machine-specific realm of technology which 
is ‘dead,’ and the intellectual-spiritual realm of technicity which is very much ‘alive’.14 We 
come to the question of whether technology is strictly neutral or ‘dead’ shortly given its 
impact upon the nature of the enemy grouping, but the key issue for this chapter, as it was 
for Schmitt, is the effect of a technological way of thinking in Obama’s war on terror on the 
concept of the political. 
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Technological thought certainly poses a challenge to the survival of the Schmittian political 
in modernity for both Schmitt and scholars who follow his direction of thought. 
Technological thought is different to technology as the broader state of being ‘immersed 
within the spirit of technicity’ due to the ‘belief that the absolute and ultimate neutral 
ground has been found in technology’.15 Alex Thompson argues that ‘a succession of 
depoliticising tendencies have dominated European politics and thought, seeking to 
subsume the properly political’ with the age of technology being the latest in this 
procession.16 As ‘technological thinking’ became the central intellectual domain of the 
twentieth century, it gave rise to the ‘liberal drive towards depoliticisation and 
neutralisation’.17 Schmitt almost seems supportive of the possibility this neutrality brings: 
unlike ‘theological’ or ‘moral’ questions, ‘purely technical problems have something 
refreshingly factual about them’.18 Nonetheless, ‘normative or ethical concerns’ are 
‘suffocated by the insidious and ever-expanding power of technological’ thought, making it 
the ‘villain of political form’.19 Thus, the divide between friend and enemy that makes 
phenomena ‘political’ for Schmitt may even be called into question when it is subsumed by 
the ever more dominant discourse that runs ‘counter to the very principle of political 
difference that provided its most fundamental grounds’.20 Crucially for this thesis, Schmitt 
believed that society’s ability to avoid this technological age’s ‘depoliticising’ effect will 
depend upon ‘which type of genuine friend-enemy groupings can develop on this new 
ground’.21 Alternatively, the depoliticisation of the technological age may in fact provide the 
grounds for ‘maximum politicisation’ because at this point technology is ‘fully at the mercy 
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of the forces that manage it’.22 The politics of friend and enemy would become 
accentuated when joined with the neutrality of the technological age; holding the ’greatest 
potential for repoliticisation’.23 Thus, there are two possible outcomes envisaged by 
Schmitt and Schmittian scholars. The first is that new friend-enemy groupings form on this 
technological ground. The second is that the neutrality of technology means that 
everything becomes political and we reach a point of hyperpoliticisation. There appears to 
be a fine line between these two possibilities, and Obama’s war on terror, and in particular 
the form of the enemy analysed below, is a prime example of the precarity of this balance. 
 
As the following sections will soon show, we do see an evolution of the political by the 
admixture of technology in Obama’s war on terror, but it is not just a case of political forces 
mastering technology. Technology in use and technological thought transfigure the enemy 
grouping, showing the formation of new friend-enemy groupings that Schmitt envisaged 
notwithstanding the fine balance with the point of hyperpoliticisation. However, taking the 
specific example of drones in the use of lethal state force, technology is not completely 
‘neutral’ as Schmitt and others following his work believed. This is because the technology 
in use shapes the corresponding manifestation of the enemy, treatment of the enemy, and 
the resulting type of war. Whereas Schmitt believed that political relations exist 
independently of technology, and technology is then mastered by political forces, here 
political relations are partly produced and shaped by technology. 
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ii. The Political and Technology in Obama’s War on Terror 
 
Technology in use contributes towards the production of political relations in Obama’s war 
on terror and it is perhaps not as ‘neutral’ as Schmitt claimed.24 Technology, however 
‘inert’, is always part ‘of institutions, tumbling in their mixed status as mediators’,25 and 
technology directs the type of mediation to a strong degree. A silk blouse and poison gas 
are thus not the same after all: poison gas will only be a particular kind of mediator, used 
to produce and shape particular relations. An human actors’ ability access to such 
technology further contradicts the notion that it is ‘neutral’. Drone technology does not 
serve everyone but only those, such as the US government, who have access to drone 
aircraft. Thus, the very ability to use poison gas or a drone against an enemy that does not 
have the same ability will affect the type of political relations that are possible between 
these two groups. A prime example of this examined in the previous chapter is the 
dominant position of operators over the unsuspecting victim below, which is only made 
possible thanks to the US military’s access to the drone. 
 
But technology mediates political relations beyond such facilitation of political goals. 
Indeed, as we also saw in the previous chapter, when technology such as the drone is in 
use it not only intensifies political intentions but produces certain kinds of political relations. 
‘Of course persons use technological instruments,’ Judith Butler reminds us, ‘but 
instruments surely also use persons (position them, endow them with perspectives, 
establish the trajectory of their actions); they frame and form anyone who enters into the 
visual or audible field’.26 This recognition that dead technology affects various changes in 
persons (and relations between persons too) is crucial to understanding how the 
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technology of the drone shapes relations between user of force and recipient of force. This 
is important: the drone manipulates the user of force’s experience of the enemy by 
creating the vertical position from which they speak of killing humans as ‘stepping on 
ants’.27 These conditions accordingly give shape to the form of the enemy in Obama’s war 
on terror. This arguably shows that Schmitt was wrong when he said that technology ‘can 
do nothing more than intensify peace or war’.28 Technology not only intensifies but 
produces certain kinds of political relations. 
 
Technological thinking also participates in the production of political relations in Obama’s 
war on terror. As we saw in this previous chapter, operators are abstracted from the act of 
killing due to the perceived predominance of drone technology in selecting and 
appropriately targeting the enemy, creating the illusory impression that the drone cannot 
hit the wrong target. The operator merely executes the ‘legal’ use of force against a 
legitimate target with precise weaponry. Here technological thinking – the absolute belief 
in technology – partly produces the political by mediating the relation between user of 
force and target. Further, the pre-determined choice of target and technical nature of the 
process – which was examined in the analysis of the kill-chain in chapter two – entail that 
time efficiency and the propensity to simply execute a successful strike drive the process. 
Although the political decision was also not a problem Schmitt believed the soldier ever 
encounters,29 here we also see the admixture of the technological with the political that 
Schmitt envisaged. Consequently, the only ‘problems’ for the soldier in Obama’s war on 
terror are of a ‘purely technical nature’, for instance, over entering the correct coordinates 
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for the drone’s missile.30 This presence of technological thought engenders the type 
political relations in Obama’s war on terror. Thus, we can see what Schmitt meant when 
he said that the age of technology will produce new friend-enemy groupings. Crucially 
however, the above instances show technological thought to participate in the production 
of the political. 
 
Here we have seen how technology and technological thought participate in the production 
of political relations in Obama’s war on terror. Contrary to Schmitt’s belief, technology in 
general, and drone technology in particular, appears not to be completely neutral, for two 
reasons: first, because it participates in the production of political relations, and second, 
because access to such technology is not equal. Technological thinking also mediates the 
relation between user of force and target. Drone technology and technological thought 
therefore transforms political relations beyond merely accentuating political intentions. 
Indeed, as the next section explores in detail, the enemy in Obama’s war on terror is 
shaped by the technological nature of the use of force. 
 
 iii. The Transformation of the Enemy 
 
Thus far I have suggested that technology contributes towards the nature of the Schmittian 
political in Obama's war on terror. This section will examine more specifically how the 
technological form of drone strikes constructs an enemy that is different from Schmitt’s. 
This is explored through a comparison with Bush’s enemy. First, we will see that Bush and 
Obama’s enemies are different from Schmitt’s understanding of the enemy because they 
are abstract and belong to an indefinite war, meaning that it is not a determinate 
identifiable grouping. Second, I will consider the different way in which this indefinite 
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enemy is constructed in Bush’s and Obama’s wars, resulting in important differences in the 
quality of the enemy. This rhetorical basis of defining the enemy in Bush’s war took centre 
stage, and it is through such language that the enemy is considered to be constructed 
abstractly. In contrast, Obama’s change in strategy and extensive use of signature strikes 
is crucial to the construction of the enemy; meaning that his enemy is produced in the 
exercise of the use of force. Obama’s enemy is abstract since it is now based upon 
supposedly common traits of ‘terrorists’, and is frequently selected by an algorithm. 
Because of these changes, the enemy is dehumanised differently under Bush and Obama. 
Finally, I argue that the US military are driven by a ‘need’ to annihilate the enemy. Thus, 
the enemy is expansive and abstract and is then sought to be made into nothing. Here I 
uncover the fine balance between ‘hyperpoliticality’ and the technologically-produced 
political. 
 
 From Schmitt’s Enemy to the Indefinite Enemy 
 
For Schmitt, the enemy is the necessary figure in the formation of the ‘political’, and it 
‘exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar 
collectivity’.31 This form of the enemy reflects the nature of wars at the time of Schmitt’s 
writing; fought by the armies of nation states, with the purpose being the ‘existential 
negation’ of the other.32 Schmitt believed that the sovereign decision33 directed ‘the 
distinction of friend and enemy’ and is made prior to the military execution of war against 
the predefined ‘enemy’, meaning that it is ‘no longer a political problem which the fighting 
solider has to solve’.34 Therefore, the political enemy is not the result of private feuds 
between individuals, but is ‘solely the public enemy’, so it is not necessarily ‘morally evil or 
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aesthetically ugly’ – as was Bush’s enemy – but simply those who are to an extent 
‘existentially something different’.35 Similarly Schmitt opposed wars fought in the name of 
‘humanity’ because they lead to the belief that the enemy is inhuman, and must be 
annihilated.36 For Schmitt, dehumanisation and the reduction of the enemy through moral 
argument have no place in the formation of the political. As Claudio Minca and Rory 
Rowan assert, Schmitt distinguishes between a ‘real’ enmity ‘tied to a concrete situation, in 
which the warring parties recognise each other as legitimate political adversaries, and an 
‘absolute’ enmity that ‘respects no limitation’.37 These conditions of the Schmittian enemy, 
and corresponding nature of war, provide the basis for the key differences with the 
manifestations of the enemy in Bush’s and Obama’s war on terror. 
 
As we saw in the context of contemporary scholarly interpretations of Bush’s friend-enemy 
distinction identified in the introduction to this thesis, differences of context do not preclude 
contemporary wars from being understood as Schmittian. Schmitt in fact recognises the 
different manifestations of the enemy that came before his work, in the thinking of Hegel, 
Hobbes and Marx, and builds upon these interpretations with a vision of conflict in his 
present time.38 Equally, this thesis recognises that there are key differences between 
Schmitt’s and Obama’s enemies. This however does not necessarily suggest a non-
Schmittian concept of the political, but instead reflects Schmitt’s belief that the enemy is 
formed existentially and not based on any pre-consigned norms or values.39 As such, 
despite this analysis showing Obama’s enemy has transformed, it is still manifest through 
the Schmittian idea of an existential negation of the other, indicating the value of Schmitt’s 
thoughts when adapted for what can be seen as our increasingly technological ‘present’. 
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A key difference between Schmitt's concept of the enemy and Bush and Obama’s enemy 
is that the latter two are located within the paradigm of indefinite war fought against an 
indefinite enemy. Scholars in fact developed the notion of an indefinite war in close 
connection to Bush’s post-9/11 war on terror.40 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri recognise 
that we have ‘proceeded from metaphorical and rhetorical invocations of war to real wars 
against indefinite, immaterial enemies’ and this results in a ‘new kind of war’ in which the 
limits ‘are rendered indeterminate, both spatially and temporally’.41 Bush’s call to ‘rid the 
world of the evil-doers’ does indeed reflect this type of indefinite war structured around 
rhetorical invocations.42 When the enemy is ‘created by language [it] is not reality but 
construct, something conditioned and assembled’.43 Bush’s particular rhetorical 
construction of the enemy takes on a distinctly moral quality. This means that, on the one 
hand there is no identifiable enemy as such, and on the other, this ‘enemy’ is infinitely 
identifiable. This rhetorical basis of defining the enemy ultimately means that the use of 
force is not strictly important in defining the enemy; rather, self-alignment with the Bush 
administration – including its uses of force – is the key. Although Bush’s call that ‘we are in 
a conflict between good and evil’ almost mirrors the Schmittian dichotomy of friend and 
enemy,44 the abstract and indefinite character of the enemy resulting from this rhetorical 
construction goes against Schmitt’s belief that the enemy is always tied to a ‘real combat 
situation’.45 This difference in clarity of the enemy demonstrates the dissimilarity between 
Bush’s indefinite enemy and Schmitt’s enemy. 
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 From Bush’s Enemy to Obama’s Enemy 
 
Notwithstanding the clear differences between Bush’s and Obama’s rhetoric as discussed 
in the first chapter, the indefiniteness of war and abstractness of the enemy remain as 
central features in the war on terror. To a degree Obama’s war continues along the same 
trajectory as Bush’s, since Obama too speaks of his enemy in abstract terms, albeit 
without the same strong moralistic parameters as Bush; being ‘those who want to kill us’.46 
Although this lack of precise identifiability may well add to the perpetual nature of war, as 
this section now examines, the true extent of the indefiniteness and abstract form of 
Obama’s enemy is ultimately produced in the military practices of his war. 
 
Although Bush’s enemy lacked the identifiable parameters that Schmitt gave to his 
‘enemy’, the military operations within Bush’s war on terror were methods to rid the world 
of such enemies. It can be said, therefore, that Bush’s war mirrored Schmitt’s belief that 
war follows enmity since the abstract quality of Bush’s enemy precedes war. In contrast, 
under Obama, war is not only a way to find the enemy, but also to produce the enemy. 
This is different to the production of enemies when drone strikes radicalise people and 
create greater opposition to its foreign policy, which occurs at a different time and is a 
consequence of American foreign policy in general.47 Instead, the drone strike analysed in 
the second chapter demonstrates this transformation of the order that enmity and war 
occur. Rather than an insignia or uniform dictating the choice of the enemy prior to a given 
operation, the US military find and construct the enemy in the exercise of war. Schmitt’s 
understanding that ‘war follows from enmity’ and ‘war is the existential negation of the 
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enemy’ has to be rewritten as it is here the technological practice of war that produces the 
enemy.48 The point at which a new individual ‘enemy’ is targeted in signature strikes is 
itself the moment at which it is included within the ‘enemy’ grouping. This technologically-
mediated moment is perhaps one of the ‘high points of politics’, which are for Schmitt the 
‘moments in which the enemy is, in concrete clarity, recognised as the enemy’.49 
Nonetheless, as this section now shows, this point at which an enemy becomes 
‘concretised’ in each individual strike does not make the enemy less vague or abstract 
overall. 
 
Obama’s use of signature strikes is central to the construction of the abstract enemy. 
Signature strikes ‘permit the CIA and JSOC [Joint Special Operations Command] to kill 
without requiring them to know who they kill’.50 These targeting procedures entail that 
military personnel select the individual target for a strike based on visually identifiable 
traits; and the enemy is an embodiment of such traits. The US military’s choice of a target 
based upon an individual’s appearance adds to this manifestation of the enemy grouping 
in each operation.51 As a US Department of Defence report shows, the US military finds 
great difficulty in pinpointing Obama’s ‘enemy’ in practice, since ‘enemy leaders look like 
everyone else’ and ‘enemy combatants look like everyone else’.52 Despite such confusion, 
individuals are targeted for having certain characteristics that are understood to be like 
those of the ‘enemy’. This approach to selecting the enemy arguably allows US military 
personnel’s presumptions regarding what an enemy should look like to determine the 
targets of air strikes. This is exemplified in two drone strikes reported by TBIJ to have 
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killed civilians by targeting ‘men who had been judged as al Qaeda based on their 
observed patterns of behaviour’.53 Here, as is the case for all signature strikes, the 
operational crew’s observations determine who and on what basis an individual is added 
to the enemy grouping. Despite operator’s having this element of ‘choice’, it appears to be 
true as it was for Schmitt that the decision on the enemy is not a problem for the drone 
operator.54 This is due to the lack of political thought required of operators, accompanied 
by the increasingly autonomous nature of drone strikes.55 The operator’s ‘choice’ is merely 
an extension of the Obama administration’s decision to execute signature strikes on the 
basis of an expanded scope of what constitutes a threat. However, the key point of 
difference from Schmitt remains: the enemy resulting from such practices is ‘abstract’ as it 
is consistently redefined, has no clear foundation or predetermined ‘identity’, and is 
unknown until the point of a strike. The enemy prior to the strike is extremely vague, and at 
the point of strike is ‘concretised’ in a particular target, but not made less vague overall. 
This is entirely different from the Schmittian idea of an identifiable collective that precedes 
the point of war, and pushes at the limit of a Schmittian political paradigm. 
 
This construction of an abstract enemy due to the technological form of drone strikes is 
reinforced by the increasingly algorithmic quality of the drone strike process whereby, 
‘algorithms are being enlisted to out-compute terrorism and calculate who can and should 
be killed’.56 For example, as Jane Mayer remarks, an algorithm can determine whether a 
‘school, hospital, or mosque is within the likely blast radius of a missile’.57 Key decisions 
regarding the enemy target are therefore ‘weighed by a computer algorithm before a lethal 
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strike is authorised’.58 This is an inherently technological mode of determining the enemy 
as the ‘political’ is shaped by and entrusted to the computing capabilities of the US military. 
When the enemy is determined by ‘coding sequences’ there is an even greater scale of 
abstraction than in Bush’s morally defined enemy.59 The enemy is not only unknown until 
the point of a strike, but the point of a strike itself is shaped by a computer system. Here 
we can clearly see the strong role of technology in the production of the political, and how 
this new technological ground engenders the enemy's abstract form. 
 
This transformation of the abstract form of the enemy under Obama entails that 
dehumanisation has a different texture from Bush’s dehumanisation of the enemy. 
Notwithstanding this difference, Schmitt would have opposed both forms of 
dehumanisation, since he was of the opinion that the enemy in a political conflict ‘does not 
cease to be a human being’.60 As we addressed briefly in the introduction to this thesis, in 
Bush’s war on terror dehumanisation manifests itself via his rhetorical framing of the 
enemy. Most prominently, Bush consistently frames the terrorist enemy as evil in 
speeches after 9/11, in which he rhetorically demonises the enemy and strips them of 
human traits as ‘this is an enemy without conscience’.61 In Schmitt’s words, Bush can 
therefore be seen to transcend the limits of the political framework by degrading ‘the 
enemy into moral and other categories’.62 Bush arguably frames the enemy by such moral 
divisions to render, for the public, ‘the requisite horrors of war tolerable’.63 The public 
audience is therefore a participant in this dehumanised construction of the enemy that 
occurs via public communications and is dispersed by various forms of media. 
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Dehumanisation in Bush’s war on terror therefore occurs at a different temporal point to 
the use of force against the enemy, and is arguably used to facilitate such violence. This is 
entirely different to the dehumanisation of the enemy in Obama’s war on terror. 
The fundamental difference is that it is the technological form of war executed via the 
drone that dehumanises the enemy in Obama’s war on terror. Obama does not employ 
dehumanising rhetoric as Bush infamously did, so this particularly public form of 
dehumanisation is absent. However, the enemy is still dehumanised, albeit on a different 
scale and at a different point in the process of the ‘war’. 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the lack of encounter between user of force and target 
and the dominant position granted to operators are material conditions that participate in 
this dehumanisation of the enemy. The ‘godlike’ dominant position determines this specific 
kind of dehumanisation, as the nature of targeting via the drone results in the 
characterisation of that target: framed as an ant prior to a strike and reduced to a mere 
bugsplat following the impact of a missile. This demonstrates the effect of the technology 
in use and technological thinking on the form of political relations including the 
dehumanisation of the enemy. 
 
 Annihilation of the Enemy 
 
To recap what we have seen so far in this section: Obama’s enemy is fundamentally 
abstract, and is produced and dehumanised in the exercise of his administration’s drone 
strike program. It is now argued that the Obama administration seek to completely 
annihilate this abstract enemy. That is: the US military are tasked and seek to reduce the 
enemy – whatever form it may take in each operation – to nothing. Schmitt in fact 
distinguished a form of war that compels enemies to retreat to their borders with the last 
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war fought for humanity in which the enemy must be ‘utterly destroyed’.64 Obama’s war on 
terror is therefore considered as a form of the latter. In fact, it can be said that to ‘defeat’ 
the political enemy is to annihilate any trace of ‘terrorism’. This reveals the fine balance 
between the technological form of the political and hyperpoliticisation, and a tension 
between this example of contemporary war and the classic Schmittian understanding of 
war. 
 
The technological thought grounding the military practices of Obama’s war on terror 
conditions the drive to annihilate the enemy. As we addressed in the first section of this 
chapter, with the help of algorithms, military operators simply need to follow an established 
technical procedure to kill each enemy, and this can be replicated indefinitely until that 
enemy is annihilated. Thus, when combined with the lack of any requirement for evaluative 
thinking—which was, as we saw, already a feature of warfare in Schmitt’s paradigm—the 
centrality of technological thinking engineers an environment in which the enemy is not 
only defeated but utterly destroyed.  
 
It is unsurprising then, considering this technical nature of drone strike operations, that the 
annihilation of the enemy is extremely methodical. There is a combination of the intent to 
reduce the enemy to nothing with the technical procedure of the method. This is shown in 
the comments of former CIA analyst Bruce Riedel who speaks of the CIA’s role as a 
process of ‘cutting the grass before it grows out of control’, meaning they have to ‘mow the 
lawn all the time’.65 Whereas for Schmitt the enemy was defeated when it is ‘compelled to 
retreat to his borders only’,66 in the war on terror, ‘defeat' comes in the form of ensuring 
that all threats, or individuals that may become threats, are completely annihilated. It is 
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therefore a prime example of the type of war that ’respects no limitation’.67 Indeed, as 
outgoing Pentagon General Counsel Jeh Johnson remarked; the end of the war on terror 
will be the point when ‘al-Qaida’ is ‘effectively destroyed’.68 
 
Interestingly, this paradigm of war as a means to annihilate the enemy coincides with the 
feature of Obama’s enemy examined above in this section: that it is made inherently 
abstract, vague, and non-identifiable given the approach taken by the US military in 
signature strikes. That is: maximum abstraction coincides with the maximum need to 
annihilate. The enemy is in a sense made without limits and then made into nothing in this 
process. It appears then, that a point of hyperpoliticisation has perhaps been reached, 
since the ‘political’ is no longer confined to a particular place or time, and the need to 
annihilate extends well beyond Schmitt’s understanding of defeat in war.  
 
Notwithstanding this arguably paradigmatic shift, it can be argued that Obama’s war on 
terror is still based upon the distinction between friend and enemy, and the Schmittian 
political is formed at the point at which the enemy is identified as such. The distinction 
between hyperpoliticisation and a transformed Schmittian political is therefore fragile in this 
current context. This fine balance is apparent because Obama’s war on terror in many 
ways transcends the limits of Schmitt’s original understanding of the political as a result of 
key material evolutions; crucially including the abstract quality of the enemy. However, as 
seen in this chapter, the war against this enemy can still be understood with a Schmittian 
lens, albeit one that recognises such material differences. Thus, the political is certainly 
complicated in comparison with Schmitt’s understanding, but it remains Schmittian to a 
degree. 
                                                 
67 Minca, Rowan, (n 17) 82. 
68 Jeh Johnson, ‘US Official Points to End of 'War on Terror’ Al Jazeera (December 1 2012) 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2012/12/20121210645962539.html> accessed June 1 2015. 
  102 
 
This precarious balance between hyperpoliticality and a transformed contemporary 
Schmittian political seen here is a consequence of the technological form of war, the 
abstract quality the enemy, and subsequent ‘need’ to annihilate it. These features are 
arguably now unexceptional in contemporary war; evidenced in western state’s strategy in 
their war against the so-called Islamic State, and accompanying assurances from heads of 
state including Obama that they will destroy this enemy.69 Thus, it can be said that we are 
witnessing a paradigmatic shift in the ‘Schmittian’ form of war in general, and Obama’s war 
on terror simply signals the beginning of this change. 
 
This section has examined the technological form of the enemy in Obama’s war on terror 
and its differences to Bush’s enemy. Obama’s abstract enemy has a different texture and 
is formed on a different scale to Bush’s since it is produced in the military practices of war, 
while the dehumanisation of the enemy too occurs at the level of military practice. It is 
evident that the technological mode of war shapes the abstract form of the enemy and the 
political relations formed with that enemy. The second key transformation examined was in 
relation to the approach taken to defeat the enemy, which is more precisely a process of 
annihilation. This drive for maximal annihilation combined with the maximal abstraction of 
the enemy demonstrates the fine balance between hypoerpoliticisation, and an evolved, 
technological form of political relations. Interestingly, the characteristics of Obama’s war 
that create this fine balance is arguably becoming an increasingly common feature of 
contemporary war in general. This transformation of the concept of the political in 
comparison with Schmitt’s understanding continues in the next section in which we 
examine the ‘friend’ grouping in Obama’s war on terror. 
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iv. The Transformation of the Friend 
 
So far in this chapter we have identified how the Schmittian political in Obama’s war on 
terror survives but is transformed by the technological conditions inherent to the drone 
strike. As we have seen, the specific conditions for the use of force construct a specific 
kind of abstract enemy. Equally, the specific character and discourse of Obama’s and 
Bush’s war create different political ‘friend’ groupings. Therefore, turning to this other side 
of the Schmittian political paradigm, this chapter now evaluates how the construction of the 
friend has transformed in Obama’s war on terror in comparison to Bush’s in order to better 
understand the degree to which the Schmittian form of politics has evolved. 
 
Schmitt believed that ‘all essential concepts are not normative but existential’ and can ‘only 
be understood in terms of concrete political existence’.70 Here, I understand the concrete 
existence of the Schmittian ‘friend’ to be formed in relation to the Bush and Obama 
administrations’ rhetorical framings of the use of force. The previous section positioned 
Bush’s rhetoric against the military practices of Obama’s war since these are the points at 
which the enemy can be seen in concrete clarity.71 Moreover, it was particularly 
importantly to focus on the military practices in Obama’s war given the significant changes 
to the enemy grouping resulting from the increased use of signature strikes therein. In this 
section however, both president’s rhetoric is the appropriate subject of analysis since I 
argue that their differences construct the corresponding Schmittian friend grouping. To 
explain this approach, the discussion first locates itself in the context of scholarly 
understandings of the Schmittian ‘friend’. David Pan’s interpretation of the Schmittian 
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‘decision’ is used as a way to think about the production of the friend via political 
communications.72 Then following the trend of the thesis so far, this section will take 
Obama’s rhetoric its primary focus, with Bush’s used as a key point of comparison. Bush’s 
moral form of political division is juxtaposed with Obama’s far more practical sounding 
rhetoric as the technological form of war feeds into the rhetorical construction of the friend. 
This representation of drone strikes invokes the modern phenomenon of ‘humane warfare’. 
It is argued that this creates an appeal to reason: the implicit question for this global public 
is now whether to support this humane type of ‘war’. This section then argues that Obama 
is better at constructing a global identity for his political ‘friend’ in comparison to Bush. 
Setting this analysis against the previous section’s analysis of the enemy, allows us to see 
the dehumanised figure of the enemy in contrast with the ‘humanity’ of the 
representationally constructed friend. 
 
 The Construction of the Friend Grouping  
 
David Pan argues that the Schmitt’s notion of the ‘decision’ – namely the decision 
separating norm and exception – is not limited to the point of a sovereign ‘command’, but 
‘must be taken as part of a representational dynamic in which the decision sums up a view 
of the past that can establish itself within the popular imagination’.73 For instance, as we 
saw in the first chapter, the Bush administration evoked the memory of 9/11 in order to 
justify the use of force in retaliation. Aligning with Pan’s analysis, it is here argued that the 
friend grouping cannot be abstracted from this representational dynamic of the use of 
force. That is: the rhetorical means through which a particular ideology or politics may 
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‘establish itself as part of a broader worldview within popular consciousness’.74  As this 
section will show, the Obama administration’s rhetoric depicting the drone strike as the 
only reasonable method to protect civilians, and Bush’s emphasis of US military strengths, 
are prime examples of the representational dynamic of each of their wars. It is argued that 
such variances in their representational dynamics appeals to different popular 
imaginations; which create the evolving form of the ‘friend’ in the war on terror. 
 
Schmitt’s Concept of the Political, and subsequent literatures on Schmittian politics, have 
focused far less on the nature of the ‘friend’ grouping than on analyses of the ‘enemy’ 
since the actualisation of the enemy forms the essence of Schmittian politics.75 It is even 
argued that Schmitt simply ‘allowed his notion to the enemy to generate his idea of the 
friend’.76 Thus, scholarship broadly understands the friend to be the grouping opposed to 
the existential form of the enemy in each concrete scenario.77 This remains a crucial 
feature of Obama’s war by drone strike, and it remains true that it is ‘not necessary that 
those people who share a relation of political friendship even know one another’.78 Thus, 
although to connect the question of the friend to the representational dynamic of the use of 
force may on first sight appear to depart from the classically Schmittian understanding of 
the friend (in which nationally demarcated political groupings play a defining role), it is in 
fact still Schmittian.79 We can see this clearly in the following section when Obama claims 
that he is protecting universal liberal ideals by using force against an exceptional minority 
who want to damage such beliefs. Obama’s rhetoric can be seen as a means to create a 
worldview to which the use of force appeals beyond nation state groupings, and an enemy 
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against whom the use of force is deemed necessary; hence displaying a Schmittian form 
of political duality when the ‘friend’ is connected to this representational dynamic. 
 
 The Friend of ‘Humane’ Warfare 
 
As has been well covered in this thesis, Bush rhetorically separated the world into two 
camps of those who are ‘with us’ or ‘with the enemy’.80 This plain use of a Manichean form 
of politics forced a choice for the global public, and this was reiterated consistently in 
Bush’s post 9/11 rhetoric. The choice, it seemed, should be obvious: ‘either you’re with 
those who love freedom, or those who hate innocent life’.81 This is the essence of the 
representational dynamic of Bush’s politics; the rhetorical means through which his 
ideology establishes itself as part of a ‘broader worldview’.82 Bush’s representational 
dynamic is clearly moralistic and divisive: there is no middle ground, since if you are not 
with us then you are by default therefore against us, and with the evil enemy. Pan argues 
that the representational dynamic of politics directly relates to the decision, and here it can 
be seen to do so by facilitating the decision to use force against the evil enemy.83 
 
By contrast, Obama shifts away from this rhetorical diametric and this creates a key 
difference between the two presidents’ Schmittian ‘friend’ grouping. It can be said that 
unlike Bush, Obama does not force the public into a choice over being with him in this war 
on terror. He does assert the legitimacy of using force but he does not restrict the public’s 
option to remain neutral like Bush did by suggesting that one’s lack of choice in fact 
positions you with the enemy.84 Instead, Obama represents the drone strike in such a way 
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as to situate it within the modern phenomena of humane warfare. This impression of a 
humane war is cultivated via Obama’s presentations of the technical qualities of the drone.  
 It appears to be a reasonable solution to threats facing civilians everywhere; as if there is 
no other option available for the public.  
 
Specifically, one level of Obama’s rhetoric draws the public’s attention to the protective 
purpose of drone strikes to underline the rationale behind the use of force. The 
phenomenon of a state framing its uses of force as a ‘humanitarian’ mission or for 
‘protection’ in order to give such violence ‘a moral veneer’ is not new,85 as evidenced by 
Bill Clinton’s framing of NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia; identifying the use of force as a 
form of humanitarian assistance.86 As Christopher Coker remarks: a feature of modern war 
is that ‘the West is trying to make it more humane, to put humanity back in the picture’.87 
Obama’s targeted killing practices follows such an approach by embellishing his use of the 
drone with the justification of protection; representing the ‘idea of wars for humanitarian 
purposes, of military invasions to save people’.88  
 
The seemingly paradoxical yet commonplace principle of killing to protect mirrors  ean-
 erv  Bradol’s disquieting assertion that ‘the construction of a ‘better world’ inevitably 
comes at a price – the lives of others’.89 The drone appeals to those who believe in the 
narrative of a better world where there are fewer terrorists threatening the lives of innocent 
civilians, and fewer innocent civilians killed when targeting terrorists. By framing his drone 
strike regime in such a manner, Obama embraces the underlying logic of the 
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Responsibility to Protect (R2P), a doctrine that has received increased use and scholarly 
attention in recent years; most prominently in relation to Libya and Syria.90 As recognised 
by Rosa Brooks, R2P ‘is equally applicable to terrorism’.91 Framed as it is, the US’s drone 
strike programme is consistent with R2P as a form of intervention exercised when states 
are unwilling or unable to address the threats that terrorism poses. Indeed, as Obama 
remarks: to do ‘nothing in the face of terrorist networks would invite far more civilian 
casualties’.92 Koh’s language equally mirrors the rationale of R2P, as he states that the US 
will take into account the ‘willingness and ability of those states to suppress the threat’.93 
Thus, the Obama administration’s representation of drone strikes aptly fits within the 
paradigm of protective intervention beyond that state’s territory. This element of its 
representational dynamic serves the significant purpose of shaping the form of the 
ideological friend in Obama’s war on terror in correlation with such contemporary western 
ideals of the use of force. 
 
However, as we saw in the first chapter, Obama goes further than stating the need to 
protect civilians by also emphasising that the method used is humane. The attention 
Obama gives to the technical qualities of the drone reflects Judith Butler’s belief that the 
US president's thinking is ‘mainly strategic, if not wholly technical’.94 This is a significant 
rhetorical turn nonetheless because it draws the public’s attention away from the ends by 
presuming the legitimacy of the target; reflecting the technological nature of the present in 
which a ‘belief in precision technology’ helps ‘justify the techno-scientific violence of the 
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West’.95 When such a technological approach to war becomes important, this arguably 
signifies the point when the West abandons ‘the most crucial consideration in every war 
and implicitly accept its legitimacy’ due to the ‘marvels of military technology’.96 And this is 
perhaps why the Obama administration’s embellishment is heavily focused on 
emphasising the perceived ‘marvels’ of the drone; taking inspiration from the modern 
phenomenon whereby ‘the ugliness of war’ is ‘concealed by euphemism’.97 
 
Obama gives the impression that the medium is technically proficient to the extent that the 
US is capable of acting humanely in the execution of a strike by avoiding civilians in areas 
targeted. The protective rationale is therefore supported by the reasonableness of the 
method. The Obama administration’s rhetorical strategy positioning the far less 
indiscriminate ‘precision’ bombing of the drone against the ‘bombardment’ of previous 
peace keeping missions arguably reflects this capability and the West’s drive to make war 
‘humane’. Whereas ‘bombardment’ and weapons of mass destruction run ‘counter to what 
the West is trying to do’,98 the very terminology of ‘precision’ associated with drone strikes 
offers a more humane depiction of war.99 This style of embellishment was presaged by 
Schmitt100 and is critiqued by contemporary scholars101 for being just as lethal and 
indiscriminate as violence that is not veiled with such nomenclature. Nonetheless, by doing 
so, Obama can emphasise the differences and qualities of this new medium.102 As we 
have seen under Bush the appeal to humanity was moralistic; for the ‘good’ of his 
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‘crusade’,103 and this created a dichotomy that dehumanised the other. Thus on the 
surface Bush’s rhetoric does not fit comfortably within the domain of humane warfare, 
instead showing the disquieting diametric Schmitt anticipated when wars are fought for 
‘universal’ ideals.104 Moreover, even if one agreed with the ‘good’ of Bush’s ‘cause’, the 
destructiveness of his methods provided a crucial point of opposition to his war.105 By 
contrast, Obama’s appeal arguably amounts to a more defensible way of making the war a 
war for humanity since it positions the technological qualities of his methods against the 
ineffective quality of previous methods. It is an effective appeal to reason since the choice 
for the global public is made simple: whether to support a humane solution to threats in 
which less civilians are killed. The use of language examined above is therefore a non-
coincidental linguistic turn through which the Obama administration introduces a register of 
‘military humanism’ more appropriate to contemporary uses of force.106 
 
In addition to protecting the world from terrorism, and civilians from non-precise weaponry 
in areas targeted, Obama also holds up the drone for its ability to save military lives. 
Obama rejects the alternative of troop deployment to combat terrorism as ‘the results 
would be more U.S. deaths, more Black Hawks down’.107 This underlines the qualities of 
the drone in juxtaposition with other less effective military interventions. This is significant 
when considering the opposition to previous US military operations. As Tina Managhan 
has argued, the rhetoric and sheer patriotism surrounding the ‘war on terror’ restricted 
opposition as unpatriotic.108 Thus, dissent to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan was instead 
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expressed as support for troops, and opposition to the rising number of troops killed.109 
Unlike troop deployment, the drone works with this dissent by reducing the number of 
military casualties. Consequently, contrary to Schmitt’s contention, the state no longer 
needs to ‘demand from its own members the readiness to die’ in order to ‘kill enemies’.110 
Rather, the drone helps achieve what seems to be emerging as a component of a well-
fought war; the saving of US military lives. Together with Obama’s call that the drone helps 
save civilians, both in the west and areas targeted, this shows how his administration’s 
representational dynamic is cohesive with ‘humane’ ideals of war. This is an impression of 
humane warfare built upon the reasonableness and proficiency of the method rather than 
simply the asserted virtues of the ‘cause’. It can be said, therefore, that the position of 
dominance examined in the previous chapter is in fact enabled by a complex of factors, 
not only the point of view enabled by drone technology, but also the control of discourse 
which is made possible because of Obama and his administration’s reverence of the 
drone’s features examined here. 
 
To recap what we have seen so far in this section: Obama’s rhetorical enhancement of the 
drone, supposedly enabling the military to pinpoint those who are a threat to innocent 
civilians, and ‘not the people they hide among’,111 creates a far less divisive form of politics 
in comparison to Bush’s strategy. Therefore, Obama arguably does better than Bush to 
locate his war within the contemporary phenomenon of humane warfare by making ‘all the 
right noises to that audience’.112 The ‘friend’ grouping is no longer those individuals who 
are explicitly with Obama, but encompasses all those who support the more humane way 
of war instead of methods that result in greater losses of life. On the basis of this 
transformation alone, it can be said that Obama’s representational dynamic engenders a 
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more credible collective political identity than did Bush’s. This quality of Obama’s 
communications is what this chapter now turns to address directly and in greater detail; 
arguing that Obama does better than Bush to create a collective political identity and 
appeal to a global political subject. 
  
Obama’s acceptance speech for the Nobel Peace Prize is a prime example of Obama’s 
rhetorical departure from Bush early in his presidency; an award that also helped to create 
the impression that US military practices are backed by global approval. In order to 
understand the significance of the committee’s choice, it is worth noting that Obama’s first 
two authorised drone strikes came three days into his presidency and killed 12 civilians.113 
This arguably shows that the principles represented by a presidency are in many ways 
what matter: as Roger Bate remarks, ‘if you seem to care and say the right things, it 
doesn’t matter if you don’t actually achieve anything worthwhile’.114 Obama used the 
acceptance speech to express these principles underpinning his foreign policy; articulating 
the rationale for using force in last resort. He recognises that state violence can be 
necessary, as a ‘non-violent movement could not have halted Hitler's armies. Negotiations 
cannot convince al Qaeda's leaders to lay down their arms’, so to say that ‘force may 
sometimes be necessary is not a call to cynicism – it is a recognition of history’, as a 
result, he asserts that ‘instruments of war do have a role to play in preserving the 
peace’.115 Obama’s speech assumed the inevitability of violence and posed a role for war 
in creating peace, and the slightly ironic location in which it was delivered arguably has a 
significant strategic purpose. Obama used his platform as the winner of the Nobel Peace 
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Prize to justify the use of force that he was to implement as US President, and this gives 
an example of the way the friend grouping is shaped in his war on terror. Because Obama 
frames the continuation of the war on terror with such a resonant comparison between 
Hitler and al Qaeda as the Nobel Peace Prize winner, the potential appeal of the use of 
force transcends national political demarcations. Like the enemy of World War II, this 
enemy is everyone’s enemy because it offends universal liberal ideals; which underlines 
the apparent inevitability of the lethal strategies Obama pursues. But again, in contrast to 
Bush he does not force the global public into a choice.  
 
Instead, Obama gives overt assurances to protect a general way of life rather than ‘mere 
physical existence’; explicitly displaying the ‘homogenous form of identity that both allows 
for the transcendence of private, physical life and opens the possibility of a particular form 
of violent conflict’.116 Obama forms this homogenous identity rhetorically by claiming that 
‘we all basically want the same things; that we all hope for the chance to live out our lives 
with some measure of happiness and fulfillment for ourselves and our families’.117 
Obama’s approach resonates strongly with Schmitt’s belief that ‘representation rests on a 
people existing as a political unity, as having a type of being that is higher, further 
enhanced, and more intense in comparison to the natural existence of some human group 
living together’.118 Indeed, he attempts to create a collective ‘we’ that transcends not only 
natural existence but also national and religious divisions, thus elevating the universal 
‘human’ identity of the political ‘friend’. It can be said, as Pan does, that Obama’s rhetoric 
‘clearly tries to deny this specific character of liberalism in order to claim that liberalism is 
in fact ‘something irreducible that we all share’’.119 This universalism of the liberal 
principles underpinning Obama’s use of force is reiterated by his claim that the enemy’s 
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belief system has little support as it’s ‘ideology is rejected by the vast majority of Muslims, 
who are the most frequent victims of terrorist attacks’.120 This contrasts with Bush’s 
divisive assertion that the ‘terrorists’ directive commands them to kill Christians and 
 ews’.121 Obama points to a supposedly universal way of life which only the enemy rejects. 
This is the collective and potentially global political identity which Obama rhetorically forms 
to open the possibility of a violent response against its collective enemy. 
 
Obama then frames his administration’s practices in response in such a way as to reflect 
these liberal ideals, which reinforces his difference from Bush and underlines the appeal of 
his war on terror to a global political subject. As we saw above, Bush provided a ‘high 
resonance framing’ of his war through ‘recurring use of words such as evil’.122 Alongside 
this demonisation of the enemy Bush enhanced the US military’s ability to end his crusade 
victoriously. He boasted that the military has ‘every resource, every weapon, every means 
to assure full victory for the United States and the cause of freedom’.123 From this 
language we can see clearly how commentators such as John Inkberry came to the 
conclusion that the US were aiming for ‘unilateral world domination through absolute 
military superiority’.124 But it can be said in retrospect that Bush’s representational dynamic 
in fact limited the reach of his ‘friend’ grouping, and that Obama seeks an approach that is 
not similarly limited. Obama breaks from Bush’s approach of amplifying the US military’s 
ability to win the war on terror, utilising the ‘enormous good will’ that ‘greeted his election, 
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rhetorically distancing himself at every opportunity from his predecessor’.125 Indeed, 
Obama seems receptive of the hegemonic character of America’s actions under Bush and 
counters this perception by recognising the cost of war beyond the loss of American 
military personnel, stating that: 
 
In today's wars, many more civilians are killed than soldiers; the seeds of future conflict are 
sown, economies are wrecked, civil societies torn asunder, refugees amassed, children scarred. 
I do not bring with me today a definitive solution to the problems of war.126 
 
Obama here gives attention to the true cost of war outside of the US and explicitly makes it 
his intention to combat these wrongs. This contrasts with Bush’s strategy of consistently 
pressing the need to act definitely with force despite such consequences.127 Obama also 
recognises the errors of his own administration’s military practices to date, in a speech 
described as a ‘masterclass’ by a ‘skilled politician’.128 He does not justify civilian 
casualties in relation to US military gains made, instead recognising that ‘for the families of 
those civilians [killed], no words or legal construct can justify their loss. For me, and those 
in my chain of command, those deaths will haunt us as long as we live’.129 As discussed in 
the previous section, Obama only then speaks about the drone’s qualities to assure his 
audience that the US are in fact capable of minimising such loss of life and it is only used 
sparingly. This sentiment underpinning the use of force can be juxtaposed with Bush’s call 
that the US’s military actions are ‘designed to clear the way for sustained, comprehensive 
                                                 
125 Stanley A. Renshon, National Security in the Obama Administration: Reassessing the Bush Doctrine, 
(Routledge 2009) 199. 
126 Obama, Nobel (n 115). 
127 Michael Termini, Exceptionalism and the George W. Bush Presidency: A New Extreme Taken at the 
Expense of the International Rule of Law (VDM Verlag Dr. Müller 2009). 
128 Glenn Greenwald, ‘Obama’s Terrorism Speech: Seeing What You Want To See, The Guardian (May 27 
2013) <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/may/27/obama-war-on-terror-speech> accessed 
October 8 2015. 
129 Obama, Drone (n 46). 
  116 
and relentless operations to drive them out and bring them to justice’.130 Obama thus 
engineers two fundamental shifts in focus: global civilian life rather than US victory 
becomes key to his war on terror, which is bolstered by the technological precision and 
reasonableness of the method. These differences are arguably crucial for cultivating 
greater appeal from a global subject since Obama speaks directly beyond the US citizenry, 
and unlike Bush, no longer forces a value choice that pays no attention to the 
destructiveness of the method. 
 
Obama’s rhetoric clearly orientates his recipient audience differently to Bush’s by 
constructing the impression that drone strikes are a considerate form of political action and 
unlike the exceptionalism characteristic of Bush’s war on terror.131 Using Pan’s words, it 
can be said that Obama’s ‘representational process’ gathers ‘up of elements of the past 
into a new order that offers genuine meaning to the recipients’.132 There is a sense of 
worldliness to the principles represented as underpinning Obama’s war on terror: looking 
to the past he recognises his administration’s own errors, shifts away from focusing on the 
loss of American lives, and accepts the narrower, non-unilateral role that the US must take 
in correcting previous military failures. This is markedly different from Bush’s approach of 
enhancing the prowess and strength of the US military to bring about victory in a war of 
good against evil. Despite the reality that ‘Obama's speeches have very little to do with 
Obama's actions’,133 this new global outlook underlines the way Obama’s representation of 
the war on terror can resonate better with a contemporary global public in comparison to 
Bush, and in turn can create a collective political identity. 
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This section has shown that under Obama the choice for the global subject is no longer 
simply one of value – between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ – but predominantly method – between the 
humane qualities of the drone against more destructive and costly alternatives. Obama 
therefore effectively evokes the contemporary ideal of humane warfare. But Obama also 
attempts to construct a collective political identity by claiming that a universal way of life is 
protected with the use of force, which is supported by the supposed reasonableness of the 
method, and recognition of American foreign policy failures. There is a worldliness unseen 
in the hegemonic character of Bush’s rhetoric, and on this basis it can be said that Obama 
is more adept at constructing a global political ‘friend’. When this ‘humane’ and liberal 
‘universal’ identity of the ‘friend’ grouping is set against the enemy that was examined 
above, we can see exactly what Schmitt presaged when he said that evoking humanity 
lent itself to a ‘surprising dialectic’ that dehumanised the ‘other’.134 The enemy is indeed 
dehumanised, while the friend is tied to a ‘universal’ understanding of humanity from which 
only the enemy is excluded. Thus, despite Obama avoiding Bush’s dehumanising 
language there is a similar duality that was evident in Bush’s war on terror, albeit on a 
different scale. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As I claimed in the introduction to this thesis, we ‘cannot escape the logic of the 
political’.135 Indeed, as I have argued here, Obama’s war on terror is still grounded in the 
Schmittian concept of the political, but the role of technology, technological thinking and 
material conditions of US drone strikes, and the specific rhetorical strategy of the Obama 
administration, have transformed the precise form of the ‘political’. 
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This chapter has analysed the relation between the antithetical domains of politics and 
technology in Obama’s war on terror, and the nature of the friend and enemy using Bush’s 
war on terror as point of comparison to understand the transformation we have witnessed 
under Obama. I argued that technology and technological thinking participate in the 
production of the political in this technological age of drones. The effect of this 
transformation was best seen in my analysis of the enemy grouping, which was a central 
focus of this chapter. Bush’s and Obama’s enemies as analysed in this chapter differ from 
Schmitt’s understanding of the enemy based upon the historical context of his writings. 
Bush’s and Obama’s enemies are situated within an indefinite war, and have an abstract 
form. But the quality of Obama’s abstract enemy demonstrates the technological form of 
political relations via the drone strike. Whereas Bush’s enemy is based on his rhetorical 
divide between good and evil, Obama’s enemy is produced in the event of a signature 
strike; determined by the appearance of individuals in areas targeted and directed to a 
strong degree by algorithms. This change in war means that the dehumanisation of the 
enemy arises differently in Bush and Obama’s wars on terror. Under Bush, 
dehumanisation is a product of a certain rhetorical frame given to the enemy. In contrast, 
dehumanisation in Obama’s war is a product of this technological form of the drone strike. 
This type of dehumanisation also contributes towards the goal of annihilating the ‘abstract’ 
enemy. Here we saw the technological nature of the political in the war on terror, and the 
fine balance between the two possibilities of a new type of friend-enemy grouping and 
hyperpoliticisation when the decision over the enemy occurs ‘everywhere’ and the US then 
seek to annihilate it. 
 
Turning to the friend grouping that opposes the enemy, this chapter argued that Bush’s 
and Obama’s ‘friend’ grouping is formed in relation to the representational dynamic of the 
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war on terror. We therefore looked at differences in the nature of their rhetorical framing of 
the use of force to demonstrate the transformation of the political ‘friend’. First moving 
away from Bush’s rhetorical divide between good and evil, Obama suggests the key 
choice is in regard to the medium. He emphasises the technological qualities and 
reasonableness of the solution meaning that only those who want to harm civilians are 
killed. The choice is no longer one of value but method. This framing is arguably far more 
appropriate than Bush’s rhetoric for situating the war on terror within the phenomenon of 
humane warfare. We then looked in more detail at the collective identity Obama attempts 
to create with this representation of the use of force. His focus on the reasonableness of 
the method is bolstered by the rhetorical creation of a universal political identity that the 
war on terror is fought to defend, and a more worldly appreciation of the effects of the use 
of force in comparison with Bush. The supposedly universal ideals of ‘humanity’ and 
‘liberalism’ are therefore central to the created identity of the political ‘friend’. When this 
‘friend’ was juxtaposed with the dehumanised enemy, the diametric caused by invocations 
of universal ideals that Schmitt warned against was bought sharply into focus. 
 
The ‘political’ in Obama’s war on terror is still therefore based on the Schmittian division 
between friend and enemy. Although the nature of these groupings are ultimately different 
from those Schmitt originally envisioned, it is a prime example of the new type of friend-
enemy grouping that Schmitt believed would arise from this age of technology. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
In this thesis I have developed an understanding of the political relations underlying the 
practices of Obama’s war on terror through a Schmittian perspective. I have done so by 
first examining Obama’s legitimising strategy in comparison to Bush’s. The contrast 
between the two president’s strategies gave the impression that Obama’s war on terror 
was different to Bush’s and less overtly Schmittian. In the second chapter I then uncovered 
the relations between user of force and target, unseen in such state rhetoric, produced by 
the drone strike’s material and technological conditions. Here we were able to see the 
characteristics of the political relations ‘behind’ such rhetoric, including: the technical 
nature of each operation, the dominance of the user of force, the paradox of intimate 
proximity and technology’s effect of dehumanising the target. Finally I mapped these 
attributes of the relations onto a Schmittian perspective of the ‘political’ and ‘technology’. 
This Schmittian lens, accompanied by the analysis of the first two chapters, has enabled 
us to ‘read’ the political relations in Obama’s war on terror and their differences in 
comparison to Bush’s war on terror. 
 
Schmitt said that the political – being the choice over friend and enemy – would change in 
the age of technology. What we established in the introduction to this thesis is that 
notwithstanding factual differences, Bush’s war on terror was still fundamentally tied to a 
classic Schmittian political paradigm. Whereas, Obama’s complete utilisation of drone 
technology abstracts the war on terror far further from the classic Schmittian concept of the 
political. Here we are arguably witnessing both what Schmitt meant by the ‘technological 
age’ and the nature of political relations therein. Two of the key transformations we have 
seen are: the indefiniteness and abstract nature of the enemy, which is now a quality 
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formed in the military practices of Obama’s war on terror, and that, in this process, the 
enemy is dehumanised and driven towards a point of annihilation.  
 
This analysis revealed that technology is not simply at the mercy of political forces, since 
politics and technology intertwine and engender the particular form of political relations 
seen in Obama’s war via the drone. This analysis also told us something important about 
the process of hyperpoliticisation adverted to by Schmittian scholars. That is: in the context 
of Obama’s war on terror there is a thin line between a new political based on this 
technological ground and hyperpoliticisation. Because of the Obama administration’s 
approach taken to find the enemy, there is ultimately no predefined enemy as such nor a 
‘grouping’ from which each singular enemy is taken. The process of annihilation of this 
enemy then completely extends beyond Schmitt’s understanding of defeat in war. This 
arguably creates the appearance that, instead of the choice of the enemy emerging at a 
specific time or place, it is ‘everywhere’ and this is therefore ‘hyperpolitical’. Yet there is 
still such distinction; the choice of the enemy is still made, and so the Schmittian political, 
albeit in a transfigured form, is still visible. 
 
We also saw the transformation of the Schmittian ‘friend’ in my analysis that took 
inspiration from Pan’s interpretation of the representational dynamic of the Schmittian 
decision. This enabled us to see how the ‘friend’ is formed in this age in which ‘war’ is no 
longer fought between separate nation states, and rhetoric plays a crucial role in garnering 
support for its war on terror. By contrast with Bush’s divisional and dehumanising rhetoric, 
Obama claims the status of a humane war via his presentation of the technologically 
proficient and reasonable method. Moreover, Obama arguably creates a more effective 
‘humane’ and ‘liberal’ collective identity for the political friend than did Bush. When we 
consider this this ‘friend’ together with the dehumanised enemy, we can see the diametric 
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presaged by Schmitt when universal ideals are claimed by one side, whilst also displaying 
a transfigured form of friend against enemy. Therefore despite material, technological and 
rhetorical changes, the Schmittian division between friend and enemy remains in Obama’s 
war on terror.  
 
By taking a Schmittian perspective of the political in this context, I was therefore able to 
coax out the particular qualities of Obama’s war on terror, and the key role rhetoric, 
technology and technological thinking plays in bringing about these changes. Thus, even if 
one disagrees with Schmitt’s belief that politics is always a conflictual domain involving a 
decision over the enemy, such a theoretical frame still helps to understand the paradigm 
shift we have witnessed in comparison to Bush’s war on terror, and the more general shift 
in the nature of political relations formed in modern ‘war’ via the drone. 
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